CVE-2015-6106
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Windows font library in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2, Office 2007 SP3, Office 2010 SP2, Word Viewer, Skype for Business 2016, Lync 2010, Lync 2013 SP1, and Live Meeting 2007 Console allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted embedded font, aka "Graphics Memory Corruption Vulnerability."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a memory corruption vulnerability in the Windows font library (Chakra JavaScript engine font parsing component) that allows remote code execution via specially crafted embedded fonts. An attacker can exploit this by tricking a user into opening a document, webpage, or other content containing a malicious embedded font, leading to complete system compromise.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2007= 2010= 2013= 2007= 2010= 2016all versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Microsoft Office versionOpen any Office application, go to File > Account > About [App] to see the exact version number (e.g., 2007, 2010)Affected if The version displayed matches 2007 or 2010 exactly
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Identify installed Lync or Skype for Business versionOpen the application, go to File > Help > About Microsoft [Lync/Skype for Business] to find the version (e.g., 2010, 2013, 2016)Affected if The version matches 2010, 2013, or 2016 exactly
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Identify installed Live Meeting versionOpen Microsoft Live Meeting, go to Help > About Live Meeting to see the version numberAffected if The version is 2007 exactly
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Check if Windows font driver component existsLocate the ATMFD.DLL file in the system32 directory (typically C:\Windows\System32\ATMFD.dll) and note its presenceAffected if The file exists on the system (indicates the vulnerable font driver is installed)
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Verify embedded font support status in OfficeIn any Office application, go to File > Options > Trust Center > Trust Center Settings > File Block Settings and check if 'OpenFile' is enabled for embedded font file types (e.g., .ttc, .otf, .ttf)Affected if Embedded font file types are allowed to open (OpenFile setting is not disabled)
Your environment is affected if you have any of the listed product versions (2007/2010 Office, 2010/2013 Lync, 2016 Skype for Business, 2007 Live Meeting, all Word Viewer versions, or Windows Vista/Server 2008) AND the vulnerable font driver component is present with embedded font support enabled.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply the relevant Microsoft security patches (MS15-121) for affected products. As an interim workaround, consider disabling embedded font support in vulnerable applications or implementing the Kill Bit for the vulnerable font driver components.
Apply Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-121 patches for the respective affected product. For Windows Vista/Server 2008, apply the cumulative security update. For Office products, apply the specific Office security updates (KB3101554 for Office 2007, KB3101555 for Office 2010, etc.)
- Identify the specific Microsoft security bulletin associated with CVE-2015-6106 (MS15-121)
- For Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008 systems: Apply the relevant security update through Windows Update or manually download and install the specific KB patch
- For Office 2007: Install Office 2007 SP3 security update (KB3101554)
- For Office 2010: Install Office 2010 SP2 security update (KB3101555)
- For Word Viewer: Install the corresponding security update for Word Viewer
- For Lync 2010: Apply Lync 2010 security update (KB3101489)
- For Lync 2013 SP1: Apply Lync 2013 SP1 security update (KB3101490)
- For Skype for Business 2016: Apply the relevant Skype for Business 2016 security update
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-6106 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-6106 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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