CVE-2015-6254
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe (1) Service Provider (SP) and (2) Identity Provider (IdP) in PicketLink before 2.7.0 does not ensure that the Destination attribute in a Response element in a SAML assertion matches the location from which the message was received, which allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors. NOTE: this identifier was SPLIT from CVE-2015-0277 per ADT2 due to different vulnerability types.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencePicketLink before 2.7.0 fails to validate that the Destination attribute in SAML Response elements matches the actual URL where the message was received. This missing validation in both SP and IdP components could allow an attacker to intercept a valid SAML assertion and replay it at a different endpoint, potentially granting unauthorized access.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2.6.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- Single
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify PicketLink installation and versionLocate the PicketLink JAR files (typically picketlink-*.jar) in the application library directory or WAR file. Check the filename or MANIFEST.MF inside the JAR for the version number. Alternatively, search for 'picketlink' in pom.xml or dependency management files if using Maven.Affected if The installed version is 2.6.0 or earlier (any version up to and including 2.6.0).
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Confirm SAML authentication is in useExamine the application configuration files for SAML-related settings. Look for PicketLink configuration in picketlink.xml, beans.xml, or similar configuration files. Search for SAML-specific elements such as <SAMLConfig> or handlers that process SAML assertions.Affected if SAML single sign-on is enabled and the application processes SAML Response elements as an SP or IdP.
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Determine if SP or IdP component is activeReview the PicketLink configuration to identify whether the deployment acts as a Service Provider (SP), Identity Provider (IdP), or both. Look for SP-specific configuration (handlers, filters) or IdP-specific endpoints in the deployment descriptor.Affected if The application functions as either an SP or IdP processing SAML assertions.
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Verify Destination validation is not implementedInspect the PicketLink library code or configuration for custom Destination attribute validation logic. Check if there are any explicit checks comparing the SAML Response Destination attribute to the actual request URL. Look for code that validates the Destination field before processing the assertion.Affected if No explicit Destination attribute validation is found in the configuration or custom code, meaning the default vulnerable behavior is present.
A user is affected if PicketLink version 2.6.0 or earlier is installed and SAML authentication is enabled (as SP or IdP), with no custom Destination validation implemented.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to PicketLink 2.7.0 or later which implements proper Destination attribute validation to ensure it matches the receiving URL.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-6254 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-6254 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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