Prime Collaboration AssuranceApplication · Cisco
CVE-2015-6389
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco Prime Collaboration Assurance before 11.0 has a hardcoded cmuser account, which allows remote attackers to obtain access by establishing an SSH session and leveraging knowledge of this account's password, aka Bug ID CSCus62707.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCisco Prime Collaboration Assurance versions before 11.0 contain a hardcoded cmuser account with a static, discoverable password. Remote attackers can authenticate via SSH using this account to gain unauthorized administrative access to the affected system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Prime Collaboration AssuranceApplication
= 10.5.1= 10.6.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify Cisco Prime Collaboration Assurance installationLocate the installation directory or use system inventory tools to confirm Cisco Prime Collaboration Assurance is deployed. Common paths include /opt/cisco/pcpa or check via package manager.Affected if Cisco Prime Collaboration Assurance is installed
-
Determine installed versionRun 'show version' within the Cisco Prime web interface or check the /opt/cisco/pcpa/version file if accessible. Alternatively, check the About page in the web UI.Affected if Version is 10.5.1, 10.6.0, or any 10.x version prior to 11.0
-
Verify SSH service statusCheck if SSH (port 22) is open and accessible on the Prime Collaboration Assurance server using 'nmap -p 22 <server_ip>' or by reviewing firewall rules and service status.Affected if SSH is enabled and reachable from network segments accessible to potential attackers
-
Confirm cmuser account existenceAttempt to enumerate users via the system or check if the cmuser account is present in /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, or the local user database if administrative access is available.Affected if The cmuser account exists on the system
User is affected if Cisco Prime Collaboration Assurance version 10.5.1 or 10.6.0 (or any pre-11.0 version) is installed with SSH accessible and the hardcoded cmuser account is present.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Cisco Prime Collaboration Assurance version 11.0 or later to remove the hardcoded account. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, implement network segmentation and ACLs to restrict SSH access to trusted sources only.
11.0 or later
- Upgrade Cisco Prime Collaboration Assurance to version 11.0 or later to remediate the hardcoded cmuser account vulnerability
- After upgrading, verify that the hardcoded cmuser account has been removed or disabled
- Change any default passwords that may still exist and follow Cisco password policies
- Review user accounts and SSH access controls to ensure only authorized users have access
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Fix this in Prime Collaboration Assurance
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-6389 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-6389 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data