CVE-2015-6474
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIBC Solar ServeMaster TLP+ and Danfoss TLX Pro+ allow remote attackers to discover cleartext passwords by reading HTML source code.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe IBC Solar ServeMaster TLP+ and Danfoss TLX Pro+ solar inverter management devices expose cleartext passwords directly in the HTML source code of their web interfaces. An attacker can simply view the page source to retrieve administrative or user credentials in plaintext.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device modelIdentify if the target solar inverter management device is an IBC Solar Danfoss Tlx Pro+ or IBC Solar Servemaster Tlp+ by checking the device label, management interface header, or SNMP/sysinfo data.Affected if The device is either the Danfoss Tlx Pro+ or Servemaster Tlp+ model from IBC Solar.
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Access the web management interfaceOpen a web browser and navigate to the device's IP address on ports 80 or 443 to reach the solar inverter web interface. Log in with any valid credentials if authentication is required.Affected if The web interface is accessible and displays any part of the device management pages.
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View the HTML page sourceIn the web browser, right-click anywhere on the page and select 'View Page Source' (or press Ctrl+U / Cmd+U) to display the raw HTML source code.Affected if The browser displays the raw HTML source of the page.
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Search for plaintext password stringsWithin the page source, use the browser's find function (Ctrl+F / Cmd+F) to search for keywords such as 'password', 'pwd', 'pass', or 'value='. Look for any input fields where the 'value' attribute contains a plaintext password string.Affected if The HTML source contains visible plaintext passwords in input field 'value' attributes or anywhere in the markup.
If the device is an IBC Solar Danfoss Tlx Pro+ or Servemaster Tlp+ and the HTML page source reveals plaintext passwords, the environment is affected by CVE-2015-6474.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace any password display functionality with masked input fields, remove credentials from HTML entirely, or implement proper authentication that does not expose sensitive credentials to client-side code. For affected firmware, apply vendor patches if available.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,560.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-6474 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-6474 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data