CVE-2015-8676
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMemory leak in Huawei S5300EI, S5300SI, S5310HI, S6300EI/ S2350EI, and S5300LI Campus series switches with software V200R001C00 before V200R001SPH018, V200R002C00 before V200R003SPH011, and V200R003C00 before V200R003SPH011; S9300, S7700, and S9700 Campus series switches with software V200R001C00 before V200R001SPH023, V200R002C00 before V200R003SPH011, and V200R003C00 before V200R003SPH011; and S2300 and S3300 Campus series switches with software V100R006C05 before V100R006SPH022 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and reboot) via a large number of ICMPv6 packets.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMemory leak vulnerability in Huawei Campus series switches (S5300EI, S5300SI, S5310HI, S6300EI, S2350EI, S5300LI, S9300, S7700, S9700, S2300, S3300) allows remote attackers to cause denial of service via large volumes of ICMPv6 packets. The device memory progressively fills until reboot occurs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= v200r001c00, < v200r001sph018>= v200r002c00, < v200r003sph011>= v200r001c00, < v200r001sph018>= v200r002c00, < v200r003sph011>= v200r001c00, < v200r001sph018>= v200r002c00, < v200r003sph011>= v200r001c00, < v200r001sph018>= v200r002c00, < v200r003sph011>= v200r001c00, < v200r001sph018>= v200r002c00, < v200r003sph011>= v200r001c00, < v200r001sph018>= v200r002c00, < v200r003sph011>= v200r001c00, < v200r001sph023>= v200r002c00, < v200r003c00= v200r003c00>= v200r001c00, < v200r001sph023>= v200r002c00, < v200r003c00= v200r003c00CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Huawei switch modelLog into the device CLI and run 'display device' or 'display version' to confirm the exact model number (e.g., S5300EI, S7700, S9300)Affected if The model is one of: S2350ei, S5300ei, S5300si, S5310hi, S6300ei, S5300li, S9300, S7700, S9700, S2300, S3300
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Check the installed firmware versionRun 'display version' in the device CLI to obtain the current software version stringAffected if The firmware version falls within the affected ranges: v200r001c00 to v200r001sph017 (for V200R001), v200r002c00 to v200r003sph010 (for V200R002), or v200r003c00 without subsequent patches (for S9300/S7700)
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Verify ICMPv6 is enabled on the deviceRun 'display ip interface' or check the interface configuration for ICMPv6 settings. ICMPv6 is typically enabled by default on these switches.Affected if ICMPv6 processing is enabled (default state) - the vulnerability triggers when the device processes incoming ICMPv6 packets
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Monitor for incoming ICMPv6 trafficUse 'display ip interface statistics' or 'display ipv6 interface' to check for ICMPv6 packet counters on active interfacesAffected if The device is receiving ICMPv6 traffic and the firmware version is within the affected ranges listed above
You are affected if you have a listed Huawei switch model running a vulnerable firmware version and ICMPv6 is enabled or processing traffic on the device.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-supplied patches (V200R001SPH018 or later for V200R001, V200R003SPH011 or later for V200R002/V200R003, V100R006SPH022 or later for V100R006) to vulnerable switches. As interim workaround, filter or rate-limit ICMPv6 traffic at network perimeter.
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- Implementation4.0 h
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- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-8676 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-8676 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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