CVE-2016-1404
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco UCS Invicta 4.3, 4.5, and 5.0.1 on Invicta appliances and Invicta Scaling System uses the same hardcoded GnuPG encryption key across different customers' installations, which allows remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by sniffing network traffic to an Autosupport server and leveraging knowledge of this key from another installation, aka Bug ID CSCur85504.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCisco UCS Invicta appliances (versions 4.3, 4.5, and 5.0.1) use a hardcoded GnuPG encryption key that is identical across all customer installations. This allows an attacker who obtains or knows the key to decrypt network traffic to Autosupport servers from any affected installation, effectively defeating the encryption protecting customer data in transit.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4.3.1= 4.3_base= 4.5.0= 4.5_base= 5.0.1= 5.0_baseCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Cisco UCS Invicta appliance modelCheck the system inventory, hardware labeling, or running configuration to confirm the device is a Cisco UCS Invicta C3124sa ApplianceAffected if The device is not a Cisco UCS Invicta C3124sa Appliance, then it is not affected by this CVE
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Verify the firmware versionUse the Cisco UCS Manager CLI or GUI to display the installed firmware version. Look for version strings such as 4.3.1, 4.3_base, 4.5.0, 4.5_base, 5.0.1, or 5.0_baseAffected if The installed version matches one of the affected versions: 4.3.1, 4.3_base, 4.5.0, 4.5_base, 5.0.1, or 5.0_base
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Confirm Autosupport feature is configuredCheck the Autosupport settings in the UCS Invicta configuration to determine if Autosupport reporting to Cisco servers is enabledAffected if Autosupport is enabled and configured to send data to Cisco Autosupport servers, making network traffic vulnerable to decryption
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Inspect GnuPG key configurationExamine the GnuPG keyring or configuration files used by the Autosupport feature on the appliance for the presence of a hardcoded encryption keyAffected if A GnuPG encryption key is found that appears identical across multiple customer installations, indicating the hardcoded key vulnerability is present
The environment is affected if the device is a Cisco UCS Invicta C3124sa Appliance running any of the affected versions (4.3.1, 4.3_base, 4.5.0, 4.5_base, 5.0.1, or 5.0_base) with Autosupport enabled and using the hardcoded GnuPG encryption key.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataContact Cisco for patched firmware that implements unique per-customer encryption keys. Until a patch is available, network segmentation and monitoring of Autosupport traffic may help detect exploitation attempts.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-1404 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-1404 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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