CVE-2016-2427
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe AES-GCM specification in RFC 5084, as used in Android 5.x and 6.x, recommends 12 octets for the aes-ICVlen parameter field, which might make it easier for attackers to defeat a cryptographic protection mechanism and discover an authentication key via a crafted application, aka internal bug 26234568. NOTE: The vendor disputes the existence of this potential issue in Android, stating "This CVE was raised in error: it referred to the authentication tag size in GCM, whose default according to ASN.1 encoding (12 bytes) can lead to vulnerabilities. After careful consideration, it was decided that the insecure default value of 12 bytes was a default only for the encoding and not default anywhere else in Android, and hence no vulnerability existed.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThis CVE claims that Android 5.x and 6.x used an insecure default authentication tag size (12 bytes) for AES-GCM as specified in RFC 5084, potentially making cryptographic protection weaker. However, the vendor (Google) explicitly disputes this CVE, stating it was raised in error and that the 12-byte default only applies to ASN.1 encoding, not to Android's actual implementation anywhere.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.54= 5.0= 5.0.1= 5.1= 5.1.0= 6.0= 6.0.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Bouncycastle Bc Java versionLocate the bouncycastle JAR file in your application classpath or dependency list and determine the exact version number (for example, check the manifest file inside the JAR or examine your dependency management system)Affected if The installed version is exactly 1.54
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Identify Android OS versionOn the Android device, go to Settings > About Phone > Android version, or use 'adb shell getprop ro.build.version.release'Affected if The Android version is 5.0, 5.0.1, 5.1, 5.1.0, 6.0, or 6.0.1
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Check AES-GCM cipher configurationInspect your cryptographic configuration or code that initializes AES-GCM ciphers (for example, Cipher.getInstance('AES/GCM/NoPadding') or equivalent) and examine the GCMParameterSpec or authentication tag length parameterAffected if The authentication tag is explicitly set to 12 bytes (96 bits) or uses a default that results in 12-byte tags rather than the full 16 bytes (128 bits)
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Verify if ASN.1 encoding is in useExamine whether your application uses AES-GCM with ASN.1 encoded parameters, as the CVE specifically targets the 12-byte default in ASN.1 contexts per RFC 5084Affected if AES-GCM is being used with ASN.1 encoding and the tag length defaults to 12 bytes
You are affected only if you use Bouncycastle 1.54, or run Android 5.x/6.x, AND actively use AES-GCM with 12-byte authentication tags in an ASN.1 context - however, Google disputes this CVE as invalid for Android, noting the 12-byte default does not apply to actual implementation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataNo remediation required per Google's statement - the vendor asserts no vulnerability exists. If the CVE's logic were followed, ensuring GCM authentication tags use the full 128 bits (16 bytes) rather than 96 bits (12 bytes) would strengthen the cryptographic protection.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-2427 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-2427 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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