CVE-2016-4973
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBinaries compiled against targets that use the libssp library in GCC for stack smashing protection (SSP) might allow local users to perform buffer overflow attacks by leveraging lack of the Object Size Checking feature.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceBinaries compiled with GCC's libssp (Stack Smashing Protection) library may be vulnerable when the Object Size Checking feature is not enabled. This feature is designed to detect buffer overflows at runtime by checking object sizes before memory operations. Without it, local users can potentially exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities in affected binaries.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify binaries or applications using libsspSearch for linked libssp libraries in your environment: use 'ldd <binary>' or 'readelf -d <binary> | grep libssp' on ELF binaries, or check application dependency lists for libssp referencesAffected if The binary links against or loads libssp (libssp.so.0 or similar)
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Check for Stack Smashing Protection symbolsInspect the binary for SSP-related symbols using 'readelf -s <binary> | grep -i ssp' or 'nm <binary> | grep -i __stack_chk'Affected if The binary has SSP symbols (__stack_chk_fail, etc.) indicating it was compiled with stack protection but WITHOUT object size checking enabled
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Verify FORTIFY_SOURCE compilation flagAnalyze the binary for _FORTIFY_SOURCE markers: use 'readelf -s <binary> | grep -E '__chk|__fortify' or examine compiled code for __builtin_object_size callsAffected if The binary lacks _FORTIFY_SOURCE markers, indicating object size checking was NOT enabled at compile time
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Inspect compiler flags used (if symbols or debug info available)If binaries contain debug info, use 'readelf -p .comment <binary>' to view compiler identification strings, or check for embedded build metadata showing compilation flagsAffected if Compiler was invoked without -fstack-protector-all, -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2, or similar object-size-checking flags
A binary is affected if it uses libssp for stack protection but was compiled without Object Size Checking enabled (missing _FORTIFY_SOURCE or equivalent flags), making potential buffer overflows exploitable.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRecompile affected binaries with Object Size Checking enabled using appropriate GCC flags such as `-fstack-protector-all` or `-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2`, and ensure the underlying GCC toolchain is updated to a version that properly implements this protection.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-4973 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-4973 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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