CVE-2016-6829
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe trove service user in (1) Openstack deployment (aka crowbar-openstack) and (2) Trove Barclamp (aka barclamp-trove and crowbar-barclamp-trove) in the Crowbar Framework has a default password, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via unspecified vectors.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisA password or key is baked into the source or binary, so anyone who obtains the code obtains the credential. These are trivially found once the software is distributed. Remediation means removing the secret, rotating it, and loading credentials from secured configuration at runtime.
General guidance for the hard-coded credentials class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped- Locate the default credential configuration for the trove service user in the Crowbar Framework configuration files (typically in the barclamp-trove or crowbar-openstack deployment configurations)
- Generate a strong, unique password for the trove service user using a secure random password generator
- Update the trove service user password configuration to use the newly generated strong password
- Ensure the new credentials are stored securely (e.g., in a secure secrets management system rather than in plain text configuration files)
- Restart the trove service to apply the new credentials
- Verify that the trove service authenticates successfully with the new credentials
- If the deployment uses automation or configuration management, update those scripts to use the new password or reference a secure secrets store
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-6829 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-6829 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data