CVE-2016-7050
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSerializableProvider in RESTEasy in Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop 7, Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node 7, Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server 7, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation 7 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceRESTEasy's SerializableProvider contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that allows remote attackers to send specially crafted serialized Java objects through the RESTEasy endpoint, leading to arbitrary code execution on the target system. This is a classic Java deserialization flaw where untrusted serialized data is processed without proper validation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.0= 7.0= 7.0= 7.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if RESTEasy packages are installedRun 'rpm -qa | grep -i resteasy' or 'rpm -qa | grep -i jboss' to list installed RESTEasy or JBoss packagesAffected if No RESTEasy packages are found, the system is not affected by this specific vulnerability
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Identify the exact RESTEasy versionRun 'rpm -qi <package-name>' on the RESTEasy package found, or use 'rpm -qa | grep resteasy' to get version informationAffected if The installed RESTEasy version matches the vulnerable version bundled with RHEL 7.0 (exact version depends on the RHEL 7.0 repository state at time of installation)
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Verify the SerializableProvider class existsSearch for the SerializableProvider class in the RESTEasy jar files: 'find /usr -name "*.jar" -path "*resteasy*" -exec unzip -l {} \; 2>/dev/null | grep -i SerializableProvider'Affected if The SerializableProvider class is present in the RESTEasy installation, indicating the vulnerable component is available
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Check for exposed RESTEasy web service endpointsInspect deployed WAR files or REST endpoint configurations in /var/lib/jbossas or /usr/share/resteasy directories, and check configuration files (web.xml, resteasy-config.xml) for registered providersAffected if RESTEasy endpoints are exposed and the SerializableProvider is registered as a provider in the configuration
A system is affected if it runs RHEL 7.0 with RESTEasy installed and the SerializableProvider class is present in a deployed configuration, allowing deserialization of untrusted data through REST endpoints.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply the vendor-supplied patches for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 to update RESTEasy to a fixed version. If patches are unavailable, disable or remove the SerializableProvider and implement network-level restrictions to limit exposure to untrusted clients.
Latest RHEL 7.0 security errata via yum update (specific RHSA patch from Red Hat)
- Ensure the system is registered with Red Hat Subscription Management or RHN (redhat-register)
- Run 'yum check-update' to check for available security updates
- Apply the security update for RESTEasy: yum update(resteasy*) or yum update to get all available security patches
- Restart any services or applications using RESTEasy after the update (systemctl restart <service>)
- Verify the updated packages are installed: rpm -qa | grep resteasy
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-7050 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-7050 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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