CVE-2016-7467
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe TMM SSO plugin in F5 BIG-IP APM 12.0.0 - 12.1.1, 11.6.0 - 11.6.1 HF1, 11.5.4 - 11.5.4 HF2, when configured as a SAML Identity Provider with a Service Provider (SP) connector, might allow traffic to be disrupted or failover initiated when a malformed, signed SAML authentication request from an authenticated user is sent via the SP connector.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe TMM SSO plugin in F5 BIG-IP APM has a vulnerability when configured as a SAML Identity Provider with Service Provider connectors. When a malformed, signed SAML authentication request is sent from an authenticated user via the SP connector, it can disrupt traffic or trigger failover. The issue stems from improper handling of malformed SAML requests in the authentication flow.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 11.5.4= 11.6.0= 11.6.1= 12.0.0= 12.1.0= 12.1.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify BIG-IP APM is installedLog into the BIG-IP management console and check for Access Policy Manager (APM) module under System > Software Management, or run 'tmsh show sys module' command to list installed modules.Affected if APM module is not present, the system is not vulnerable.
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Check APM version against affected releasesRun 'tmsh show sys version' or view the APM version in the management console under Access Policy Manager > Overview > Statistics. Compare the installed version to 11.5.4, 11.6.0, 11.6.1, 12.0.0, 12.1.0, or 12.1.1.Affected if The installed version matches one of the affected versions listed in the CVE.
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Confirm SAML IdP configuration with SP connectorsNavigate to Access Policy Manager > SSO > SAML and verify if a SAML Identity Provider is configured. Under the IdP configuration, check for Service Provider connector objects defined.Affected if A SAML IdP is configured with one or more SP connectors - this is the required configuration for the vulnerability.
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Inspect TMM SSO plugin statusRun 'tmsh show apm ssl' or check the TMM process status via 'tmsh show sys tmm-info' to confirm the TMM SSO plugin is active for APM.Affected if TMM SSO plugin is running and handling SAML authentication traffic.
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Review logs for malformed SAML request errorsCheck /var/log/apm for entries containing 'SAML', 'malformed', 'parse error', or authentication failures around the time of traffic disruption or failover events.Affected if Logs show malformed SAML request processing errors from SP connector traffic.
The environment is affected only if BIG-IP APM is running an exact affected version (11.5.4, 11.6.0, 11.6.1, 12.0.0, 12.1.0, or 12.1.1) AND is configured as a SAML Identity Provider with Service Provider connectors, enabling the TMM SSO plugin to process malformed signed SAML requests that could disrupt traffic.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade BIG-IP APM to a version beyond 12.1.1, 11.6.1 HF1, or 11.5.4 HF2. If immediate upgrade is not possible, review SAML SP connector configurations and monitor for anomalous authentication requests.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-7467 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-7467 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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