CVE-2016-8374
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in Schneider Electric Magelis HMI Magelis GTO Advanced Optimum Panels, all versions, Magelis GTU Universal Panel, all versions, Magelis STO5xx and STU Small panels, all versions, Magelis XBT GH Advanced Hand-held Panels, all versions, Magelis XBT GK Advanced Touchscreen Panels with Keyboard, all versions, Magelis XBT GT Advanced Touchscreen Panels, all versions, and Magelis XBT GTW Advanced Open Touchscreen Panels (Windows XPe). An attacker may be able to disrupt a targeted web server, resulting in a denial of service because of UNCONTROLLED RESOURCE CONSUMPTION.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis CVE describes a denial of service vulnerability in the embedded web servers of Schneider Electric Magelis HMI panels. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send specially crafted requests that cause uncontrolled resource consumption on the web server, potentially rendering it unavailable. The vulnerability affects multiple Magelis HMI model families (GTO, GTU, STO5xx/STU, XBT GH/GK/GT/GTW) across all versions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Magelis HMI modelAccess the device directly or check device documentation/inventory to confirm the exact model number. Look for model families: GTO, GTU, STO5xx, STU, XBT GH, XBT GK, XBT GT, or XBT GTW.Affected if The device is any of these Magelis HMI model families (GTO, GTU, STO5xx, STU, XBT GH/GK/GT/GTW)
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Confirm the web server is enabledLog into the HMI configuration or Vijeo Designer software and navigate to the web server settings. Alternatively, attempt to access the device web interface via HTTP (port 80) or HTTPS (port 443) from an authorized network.Affected if The embedded web server functionality is turned on and accessible on the device
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Verify network accessibility of web server portsFrom an authorized management workstation, attempt to reach the device web interface using a browser to the IP address of the HMI on ports 80 or 443. Use network scanning tools to confirm if ports 80/tcp or 443/tcp are open and responding.Affected if The web server ports (80/tcp or 443/tcp) are open and reachable from any network segment
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Review firewall and network segmentationCheck network infrastructure devices (firewalls, switches) to determine if access to the HMI web server ports is permitted from untrusted network zones. Review ACLs and security policies governing the network where the HMI is deployed.Affected if No network restrictions exist between untrusted users/networks and the HMI web server ports
You are affected if you have any Magelis HMI from the GTO, GTU, STO5xx, STU, or XBT GH/GK/GT/GTW families with the embedded web server enabled and accessible from your network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataNetwork segmentation should isolate HMI devices from untrusted networks, and firewall rules should restrict access to the web server ports (typically HTTP/HTTPS). If the web server functionality is not operationally required, it should be disabled. Apply any vendor firmware updates when available.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-8374 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-8374 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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