CVE-2016-9589
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUndertow in Red Hat wildfly before version 11.0.0.Beta1 is vulnerable to a resource exhaustion resulting in a denial of service. Undertow keeps a cache of seen HTTP headers in persistent connections. It was found that this cache can easily exploited to fill memory with garbage, up to "max-headers" (default 200) * "max-header-size" (default 1MB) per active TCP connection.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUndertow in Wildfly before 11.0.0.Beta1 maintains a cache of HTTP headers for persistent connections. This cache is vulnerable to resource exhaustion because an attacker can fill it with garbage data, consuming up to max-headers (default 200) times max-header-size (default 1MB) = 200MB per active TCP connection, leading to denial of service.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 10.1.0= 11.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Wildfly versionLocate the Wildfly installation and check the version. Common locations: check the 'jboss-modules.jar' or 'wildfly.jar' in the installation root, or run 'grep -r "WildFly" <install_dir>/modules' or check server log startup bannerAffected if Version is 10.1.0 or lower, or exactly version 11.0.0 (unpatched Beta1)
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Confirm Undertow is the HTTP connectorCheck the standalone.xml configuration file (typically in <wildfly_dir>/standalone/configuration/) for <server name="default-server"> section. Look for <http-listener> entries that use Undertow. The vulnerability exists in the Undertow HTTP listener.Affected if Undertow is configured as the HTTP listener (default in Wildfly 8+)
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Inspect max-header-size configurationIn standalone.xml, find the http-listener element and check the 'max-header-size' attribute. If not present, it defaults to 1MB (1048576 bytes). Example path: /subsystem=undertow/server=default-server/http-listener=defaultAffected if max-header-size is set to default 1MB or a large value, creating potential for large memory allocation per connection
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Inspect max-headers configurationIn standalone.xml, find the <host> element under <subsystem xmlns="urn:jboss:domain:undertow:..."> and check the 'max-headers' attribute. If not present, it defaults to 200. Example: /subsystem=undertow/server=default-server/host=default-hostAffected if max-headers is set to default 200 or a high value, allowing many headers per connection
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Determine network exposureCheck if the Wildfly HTTP listener is bound to a public or untrusted network interface. Look for 'bind-address' in standalone.xml or the -b startup parameter. Check firewall rules and network ACLs controlling access to the HTTP port (default 8080)Affected if HTTP interface is exposed to untrusted networks without proper access controls, enabling remote attackers to trigger the resource exhaustion
You are affected if running Wildfly version 10.1.0 or lower, or exactly 11.0.0, with Undertow exposed to untrusted networks and default or large max-headers/max-header-size settings.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Wildfly to version 11.0.0.Beta1 or later to obtain the patched Undertow component, or apply configuration limits to max-headers and max-header-size to reduce the memory exhaustion potential per connection.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-9589 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-9589 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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