CVE-2017-10934
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAll versions prior to V5.09.02.02T4 of the ZTE ZXIPTV-EPG product use the Java RMI service in which the servers use the Apache Commons Collections (ACC) library that may result in Java deserialization vulnerabilities. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerabilities by sending a crafted RMI request to execute arbitrary code on the target host.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe ZTE ZXIPTV-EPG product's Java RMI service uses the Apache Commons Collections library, which contains known Java deserialization flaws. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send crafted RMI requests to achieve arbitrary code execution on the target host due to insecure deserialization of untrusted data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 5.09.02.02t4CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm ZTE ZXIPTV-EPG is installedIdentify the product through its web interface (typically on port 8080 or 80), service process, or by reviewing network services listening on the systemAffected if The product is present and running on the target host
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Check firmware versionAccess the ZXIPTV-EPG admin interface and navigate to System Information or About section to view the firmware version, or check version files in the system if CLI access is availableAffected if The installed firmware version is lower than 5.09.02.02t4 (for example, 5.09.02.00, 5.08.x, or earlier)
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Verify RMI service is exposedScan for open ports associated with RMI (commonly port 1099 or custom RMI registry ports) on the host using nmap or netstat: nmap -p 1099,1090,9000-9100 <target>Affected if Port 1099 or other RMI registry ports are open and accessible from the network
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Confirm library is vulnerableIf file system access is available, locate the Commons Collections library (typically commons-collections*.jar) within the application deployment directory and check its version; vulnerable versions include 3.1, 3.2.1, and earlierAffected if The Apache Commons Collections library version is 3.2.1 or earlier, or if the library file cannot be found and the firmware is below the patched version
A host is affected if it runs ZTE ZXIPTV-EPG with firmware version below 5.09.02.02t4 and has the RMI service exposed on the network, making it vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution through deserialization attacks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped5.09.02.02t4
Upgrade ZTE ZXIPTV-EPG to version V5.09.02.02T4 or later to obtain the patched Apache Commons Collections library; if immediate patching is not feasible, isolate the RMI service behind a firewall or disable it if unnecessary.
V5.09.02.02T4
- Identify the current firmware version of the ZTE ZXIPTV-EPG device
- Obtain the V5.09.02.02T4 firmware update from official ZTE sources (support.zte.com.cn)
- Follow ZTE's standard firmware upgrade procedure for the ZXIPTV-EPG device
- Verify the upgrade was successful by confirming the firmware version is V5.09.02.02T4 or later
- After upgrade, verify the RMI service is no longer vulnerable by confirming the Apache Commons Collections library has been patched or removed
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-10934 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-10934 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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