AssistantApplication · Synology

CVE-2017-11160

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.0 Published 2017-08-18
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 6.1-15030 or later.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Multiple untrusted search path vulnerabilities in installer in Synology Assistant before 6.1-15163 on Windows allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code and conduct DLL hijacking attack via a Trojan horse (1) shfolder.dll, (2) ntmarta.dll, (3) secur32.dll or (4) dwmapi.dll file in the current working directory.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Synology Assistant Windows installer before version 6.1-15163 suffers from multiple untrusted search path vulnerabilities allowing DLL hijacking. The installer loads DLLs (shfolder.dll, ntmarta.dll, secur32.dll, dwmapi.dll) from the current working directory without validating the path, enabling a local attacker to place malicious DLLs with these names to achieve arbitrary code execution.

MitigationUpgrade Synology Assistant to version 6.1-15163 or later. As a temporary measure, ensure the installer is run from a trusted directory and avoid placing it in writable locations.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
AssistantApplication
Affected:<= 6.1-15030

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Locate Synology Assistant installer or installed application
    Search for 'Synology Assistant' in Add/Remove Programs, or check typical installation paths like C:\Program Files\Synology\, or search for 'SynologyAssistant.exe' on the system
    Affected if Synology Assistant installer or application is found on the system
  2. Determine the version of the installer or installed application
    Right-click on the installer file or SynologyAssistant.exe, select Properties, and check the Details tab for the File Version. Alternatively, run 'wmic product where "name like 'Synology Assistant'" get version,installlocation' in Command Prompt
    Affected if Version is 6.1-15030 or lower (the installer) or version is 6.1-15030 or lower (the installed application that came with that installer)
  3. Confirm the DLL hijacking condition applies
    The vulnerability requires running the installer from a writable directory where a malicious DLL (shfolder.dll, ntmarta.dll, secur32.dll, or dwmapi.dll) could be placed. Check if you have downloaded the installer to a folder like Downloads or Desktop where other files may exist
    Affected if The installer is run from a directory where untrusted files could be present, combined with a version at or below 6.1-15030

You are affected if you have downloaded and run the Synology Assistant installer version 6.1-15030 or lower, or have an installed version that was installed using a vulnerable installer version, especially if the installer was run from a writable or untrusted directory.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 6.1-15030
Interim mitigation

Upgrade Synology Assistant to version 6.1-15163 or later. As a temporary measure, ensure the installer is run from a trusted directory and avoid placing it in writable locations.

Fix this in Assistant Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation1.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
11.0 hours of engineering $1,880
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,008.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-11160 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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