TorApplication · Debian

CVE-2017-11565

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.0 Published 2017-07-23
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
debian/tor.init in the Debian tor_0.2.9.11-1~deb9u1 package for Tor was designed to execute aa-exec from the standard system pathname if the apparmor package is installed, but implements this incorrectly (with a wrong assumption that the specific pathname would remain the same forever), which allows attackers to bypass intended AppArmor restrictions by leveraging the silent loss of this protection mechanism. NOTE: this does not affect systems, such as default Debian stretch installations, on which Tor startup relies on a systemd unit file (instead of this tor.init script).

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The tor.init script in Debian's tor package attempts to execute aa-exec (AppArmor's execution wrapper) from a hardcoded system pathname, but implements this incorrectly by assuming the pathname remains static forever. When this assumption fails, the aa-exec protection silently fails to activate, allowing Tor to run without AppArmor enforcement and enabling attackers to bypass intended AppArmor restrictions. This only affects systems using the init script for Tor startup, not those using systemd unit files.

MitigationIf the system uses the tor.init script (check with `systemctl status tor` or examining /etc/init.d/tor), replace it with systemd-based startup or update the aa-exec invocation to use a reliable method; default Debian stretch and later are unaffected.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
TorApplication
Affected:= 0.2.9.11-1

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the installed Tor version
    Run `dpkg -l | grep tor` or `tor --version` to see the installed Debian Tor package version
    Affected if Version equals 0.2.9.11-1 exactly
  2. Determine if Tor is started via the init script
    Run `systemctl status tor` or check if /etc/init.d/tor exists and is used
    Affected if The init script /etc/init.d/tor is actively used to start Tor (not systemd)
  3. Inspect the tor.init script for aa-exec invocation
    Examine /etc/init.d/tor and search for the hardcoded aa-exec path (typically /usr/sbin/aa-exec) in the script
    Affected if The script contains aa-exec invocation but relies on a static pathname that may become invalid

You are affected if Tor version 0.2.9.11-1 is installed AND Tor is started using the /etc/init.d/tor script rather than systemd, causing AppArmor enforcement to silently fail.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

If the system uses the tor.init script (check with `systemctl status tor` or examining /etc/init.d/tor), replace it with systemd-based startup or update the aa-exec invocation to use a reliable method; default Debian stretch and later are unaffected.

Fix this in Tor Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation1.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
6.0 hours of engineering $1,060
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-11565 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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