CVE-2017-13100
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedDistinctDev, Inc., The Moron Test, 6.3.1, 2017-05-04, iOS application uses a hard-coded key for encryption. Data stored using this key can be decrypted by anyone able to access this key.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe iOS application 'The Moron Test' version 6.3.1 uses a hard-coded encryption key embedded in the application binary. This static key is used to encrypt stored data, but because it can be extracted from the app code by anyone with access to the binary, all data encrypted with this key can be trivially decrypted by attackers.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 6.3.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed application versionCheck the version of The Moron Test installed on the iOS device through the App Store app details page, iTunes, or the app's built-in version info (usually accessible via Settings > Apps > The Moron Test or within the app's about/settings screen)Affected if The version is exactly 6.3.1
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Locate the application binaryObtain the The Moron Test IPA file (either by downloading from a jailbroken device or extracting from the app bundle if you have access). The binary will be named 'TheMoronTest' or similar within the Payload folder.Affected if You have access to the application binary for analysis
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Search binary for hard-coded encryption keysUse strings analysis or hex dump tools on the decrypted application binary (e.g., using 'strings', 'grep', or IDA/Ghidra) to search for hexadecimal or Base64 strings that appear to be encryption keys (typically 16, 24, or 32 bytes for AES). Look for patterns consistent with cryptographic keys embedded in the code.Affected if A static encryption key is found embedded directly in the binary code or as a hard-coded string constant
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Verify encrypted local storage existsExamine the application's data directory on the device (located in /var/mobile/Applications/<appGUID>/Documents or /Library/Application Support) for encrypted files, SQLite databases, or plist files that contain encrypted/obfuscated dataAffected if The application stores data locally that appears encrypted or obfuscated
You are affected if you have The Moron Test version 6.3.1 installed and analysis of its binary reveals a hard-coded static encryption key used to protect stored data.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace the hardcoded encryption key with dynamically generated keys using device-specific key derivation (e.g., Keychain with SecRandomCopyBytes or hardware-backed keystore) and implement proper key management; existing encrypted data should be re-encrypted with the new key management system.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,408.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-13100 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-13100 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data