Dev Python FlowerApplication · Gentoo

CVE-2017-14483

MEDIUM · 5.5 CVSS v3.0 Published 2017-09-15
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 0.9.1 or later.
See remediation →
57/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
flower.initd in the Gentoo dev-python/flower package before 0.9.1-r1 for Celery Flower sets PID file ownership to a non-root account, which might allow local users to kill arbitrary processes by leveraging access to this non-root account for PID file modification before a root script executes a "kill `cat /pathname`" command.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Gentoo dev-python/flower package's init script (flower.initd) creates a PID file with ownership set to a non-root account. A local user with access to this account can modify the PID file to point to any process ID on the system. When the init script runs as root and executes 'kill $(cat /pathname)', it will terminate the arbitrary process specified in the modified PID file, enabling local privilege escalation to kill root-owned processes.

MitigationUpgrade dev-python/flower to version 0.9.1-r1 or later, which corrects the PID file ownership to root. Alternatively, ensure the PID file directory has restricted permissions to prevent unauthorized modification.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Dev Python FlowerApplication
Affected:<= 0.9.1

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check installed flower version
    Run `emerge -p dev-python/flower` or `equery list dev-python/flower` to list installed version. Alternatively, check `/var/lib/portage/world` or package database.
    Affected if Version is 0.9.1 or lower (unmasked) or <= 0.9.1-r1 (any ebuild revision)
  2. Locate the init script
    Check for `/etc/init.d/flower` or the init script path referenced in the Flower package. Run `find /etc -name '*flower*' -o -name '*flower*' 2>/dev/null`.
    Affected if The init script exists on the system
  3. Identify the PID file path
    Examine the init script content (e.g., `cat /etc/init.d/flower`) and look for PIDFILE or pidfile variable assignments. Common paths include `/var/run/flower.pid` or `/run/flower.pid`.
    Affected if A PID file path is defined in the init script
  4. Verify PID file ownership and permissions
    Run `ls -la <PID_FILE_PATH>` to check owner, group, and permissions. If the file does not exist yet, check the directory permissions: `ls -ld $(dirname <PID_FILE_PATH>)`.
    Affected if The PID file or its directory is owned by a non-root user or is world/group-writable, allowing modification by local non-root accounts

If flower version is 0.9.1 or lower AND the PID file or its directory is writable by non-root users, the system is vulnerable to local privilege escalation via process termination.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 0.9.1
Interim mitigation

Upgrade dev-python/flower to version 0.9.1-r1 or later, which corrects the PID file ownership to root. Alternatively, ensure the PID file directory has restricted permissions to prevent unauthorized modification.

Fix this in Dev Python Flower Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation1.0 h
  • Implementation1.0 h
  • Testing1.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
4.0 hours of engineering $750
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-14483 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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