Hub FirmwareOperating system · Insteon

CVE-2017-16320

CRITICAL · 9.9 CVSS v3.1 Published 2023-01-11
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Multiple exploitable buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist in the PubNub message handler for the "cc" channel of Insteon Hub running firmware version 1012. Specially crafted commands sent through the PubNub service can cause a stack-based buffer overflow overwriting arbitrary data. An attacker should send an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability. In cmd s_sonos, at 0x9d01ddd4, the value for the `s_sonos_cmd` key is copied using `strcpy` to the buffer at `$sp+0x290`.This buffer is 32 bytes large, sending anything longer will cause a buffer overflow.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Stack-based buffer overflow in Insteon Hub firmware 1012 where the PubNub message handler for the 'cc' channel copies the s_sonos_cmd parameter using unbounded strcpy into a 32-byte buffer at stack pointer offset 0x290, allowing overflow with payloads exceeding 32 bytes.

MitigationReplace strcpy with bounds-checked functions (strncpy/strlcpy) and implement input validation for the s_sonos_cmd parameter in the firmware; apply vendor firmware patch when available.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Hub FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 1012

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Insteon Hub device
    Confirm the target device is an Insteon Hub (model 2245-222) by checking device documentation, network inventory, or device management interface
    Affected if Device is not an Insteon Hub, then not affected by this CVE
  2. Check firmware version
    Access the Insteon Hub administration interface or use the Insteon app to view the installed firmware version; compare against version 1012
    Affected if Firmware version is anything other than exactly 1012, then not affected by this CVE
  3. Verify PubNub integration is enabled
    Check if the Insteon Hub has PubNub cloud connectivity enabled in the device settings or network configuration
    Affected if PubNub is disabled or not configured, the attack surface may not be exposed
  4. Confirm cc channel accessibility
    Determine if the PubNub 'cc' channel is accessible by checking device network configuration or API endpoints; this is the channel that handles the s_sonos_cmd parameter
    Affected if The cc channel is not accessible or not in use, the specific vulnerability path may not be reachable

The device is affected only if it is an Insteon Hub running firmware version 1012 with PubNub cc channel enabled and accessible, allowing external injection of the s_sonos_cmd parameter into the vulnerable strcpy call.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace strcpy with bounds-checked functions (strncpy/strlcpy) and implement input validation for the s_sonos_cmd parameter in the firmware; apply vendor firmware patch when available.

Fix this in Hub Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
34.0 hours of engineering $6,000
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-16320 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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