SapphireimsApplication

CVE-2017-16632

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2021-08-11
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
In SapphireIMS 4097_1, the password in the database is stored in Base64 format.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

SapphireIMS 4097_1 stores user passwords in the database using Base64 encoding rather than proper cryptographic hashing. Base64 is a reversible encoding scheme that provides no security protection—anyone with database access can trivially decode all stored passwords. This exposes credentials to immediate compromise if the database is breached.

MitigationMigrate to proper password hashing algorithms (e.g., bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2) with unique per-user salts. Existing Base64-encoded passwords must be hashed upon next user login or through a forced password reset campaign.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
SapphireimsApplication
Affected:= 4097_1

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check SapphireIMS version
    Locate the installed SapphireIMS version by inspecting the application metadata, about page, or version file typically found in the web application root directory. Look for a version identifier file or check the application banner.
    Affected if The installed version is exactly 4097_1
  2. Access the user credentials database
    Connect to the SapphireIMS database using the credentials configured in the application's database connection settings (typically found in a configuration file). Navigate to the user or administrator table that stores authentication credentials.
    Affected if Database access is available and contains a user table with password fields
  3. Inspect stored password format
    Examine the password field contents for a sample user account. Base64 encoded passwords will appear as alphanumeric strings that decode to readable text using standard Base64 decoding tools. Look for patterns like 'c2Fwc2Fw' decoding to 'sapsap'.
    Affected if Stored password values decode to plain text using Base64 decoding, indicating reversible encoding rather than a cryptographic hash
  4. Verify hash non-reversibility
    Attempt to verify that stored passwords are not properly hashed by checking if they match known plaintext after Base64 decoding. If multiple passwords decode successfully and resemble plaintext credentials, the system uses insecure storage.
    Affected if Passwords are recoverable in plaintext form through Base64 decoding, confirming they are not cryptographically hashed

A user is affected if they run SapphireIMS version 4097_1 and the database contains password fields that decode from Base64 to plain text rather than being stored as irreversible salted hashes.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Migrate to proper password hashing algorithms (e.g., bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2) with unique per-user salts. Existing Base64-encoded passwords must be hashed upon next user login or through a forced password reset campaign.

Fix this in Sapphireims Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
32.0 hours of engineering $5,600
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-16632 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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