Debian LinuxOperating system · Debian

CVE-2017-17847

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.0 Published 2017-12-27
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 1.9.9 or later.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
An issue was discovered in Enigmail before 1.9.9. Signature spoofing is possible because the UI does not properly distinguish between an attachment signature, and a signature that applies to the entire containing message, aka TBE-01-021. This is demonstrated by an e-mail message with an attachment that is a signed e-mail message in message/rfc822 format.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Enigmail before version 1.9.9 contains a signature spoofing vulnerability where the UI fails to distinguish between a signature applied to an attachment versus a signature applied to the entire email message. An attacker can craft an email with a signed attachment in message/rfc822 format, misleading users into believing the entire message is authenticated when only the attachment is signed.

MitigationUpgrade to Enigmail 1.9.9 or later, which properly differentiates and displays signature status for attachments versus the full message content.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Debian LinuxOperating system
Affected:= 8.0= 9.0
EnigmailApplication
Affected:< 1.9.9

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify Enigmail is installed
    Open Thunderbird, go to Add-ons Manager (Ctrl+Shift+A), or check for the Enigmail entry in the Thunderbird application menu under Extensions or Add-ons.
    Affected if Enigmail is listed as an installed extension
  2. Determine Enigmail version number
    In Thunderbird Add-ons Manager, click on Enigmail to view its details panel; the version number is displayed on that page.
    Affected if The version shown is lower than 1.9.9 (for example, 1.9.8, 1.9.7, etc.)
  3. Check for signed email handling
    Inspect any received emails that contain attachments in message/rfc822 format (nested emails). In Thunderbird, expand the attachment to view the nested message and check whether the Enigmail security banner shows a valid signature indicator.
    Affected if A signed attachment displays the same signature indicator as would appear for a fully signed message, without clear visual distinction that only the attachment (not the outer message) is signed
  4. Verify Debian package version if using system package
    On Debian systems, run: dpkg -l | grep enigmail or apt show enigmail to query the installed package version.
    Affected if The installed Enigmail package version is less than 1.9.9

You are affected if Enigmail is installed with a version below 1.9.9 and you handle PGP-signed emails containing message/rfc822 attachments, as the UI does not differentiate attachment signatures from message signatures.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to 1.9.9 or later
Fixed in 1.9.9
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to Enigmail 1.9.9 or later, which properly differentiates and displays signature status for attachments versus the full message content.

Fix this in Debian Linux Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
13.0 hours of engineering $2,290
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-17847 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-17847 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data