CVE-2017-3214
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Milwaukee ONE-KEY Android mobile application stores the master token in plaintext in the apk binary.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Milwaukee ONE-KEY Android application stores a master authentication token in plaintext directly within the APK binary. Anyone who obtains the APK can extract this token using standard reverse engineering tools (strings, APK decompilers) and potentially impersonate legitimate users or access associated IoT devices.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Obtain the Milwaukee ONE-KEY APK fileExtract the APK from your Android device using ADB (adb shell pm list packages | grep onekey, then adb shell pm path com.milwaukee.onekey, then pull the APK) or download it from a trusted APK repository.Affected if You have successfully obtained the APK file for analysis.
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Extract printable strings from the APKUse the 'strings' command on the APK (strings app.apk > strings.txt) or decompress the APK and run strings on the classes.dex file. Review the output for token-like patterns.Affected if The output contains long alphanumeric strings that resemble authentication tokens (typically 20+ characters, base64-encoded, or UUID format).
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Search for hardcoded credentials in the decompiled codeDecompile the APK using tools like jadx or apktool. In the decompiled source, search for variables named 'token', 'auth', 'key', 'password', or 'credential' that contain static string values rather than dynamically retrieved values.Affected if The code contains hardcoded string values assigned to authentication-related variables.
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Verify if the token grants elevated accessIf a token-like string is found, examine whether it appears to be a master/authentication token (often labeled as 'master', 'admin', or 'master_token' in the code or comments). Check if the app uses this same token for all installations rather than generating unique per-user tokens.Affected if The same token string appears identically across different APK samples or builds, indicating it is a shared master token embedded in the application.
If the APK contains any hardcoded plaintext or statically embedded authentication tokens that are used universally across installations, your environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRemove the hardcoded plaintext token from the APK and implement proper secure credential management using Android Keystore or equivalent secure storage mechanisms, with token generation handled server-side rather than embedded in the client.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,328.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-3214 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-3214 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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