CVE-2017-5186
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedNovell iManager 2.7 before SP7 Patch 9, NetIQ iManager 3.x before 3.0.2.1, Novell eDirectory 8.8.x before 8.8 SP8 Patch 9 Hotfix 2, and NetIQ eDirectory 9.x before 9.0.2 Hotfix 2 (9.0.2.2) use the deprecated MD5 hashing algorithm in a communications certificate.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMultiple Novell and NetIQ products (iManager 2.7/3.x and eDirectory 8.8.x/9.x) use the cryptographically weak MD5 hashing algorithm for communications certificates, making them vulnerable to collision attacks and potential certificate forgery.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 9.0= 9.0.1= 9.0.2= 3.0= 3.0.1= 3.0.2<= 8.8<= 2.7CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed eDirectory versionUse the 'ndsconfig get n4u.server.version' command or check the eDirectory version through the iManager console under the 'eDirectory Maintenance' sectionAffected if The version matches 9.0, 9.0.1, 9.0.2 for NetIQ eDirectory, or is 8.8.x or lower for Novell eDirectory
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Identify installed iManager versionCheck the iManager version by logging into the iManager web interface, typically displayed on the login page or in the 'Help > About' section, or check the installed package version using the operating system's package managerAffected if The version matches 3.0, 3.0.1, 3.0.2 for NetIQ iManager, or is 2.7 or lower for Novell iManager
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Inspect certificate hash algorithmExport or view the SSL/TLS certificate used for eDirectory or iManager communications (typically found in the server's certificate store or LDAPS configuration), then use 'openssl x509 -in <cert.pem> -noout -text' to view the certificate signature algorithmAffected if The signature algorithm shows 'md5', 'MD5', or 'sha1WithRSAEncryption' indicating a weak hash is in use for certificate signing
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Check LDAPS configurationExamine the LDAPS settings in the eDirectory Admin console or check the ssl configuration files for the LDAP/SSL service (commonly in /etc/opt/novell/ssl or through the iManager 'LDAP' > 'SSL/TLS' settings)Affected if The configuration references certificates using MD5-based signatures or does not specify a stronger hash algorithm like SHA-256
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Verify certificate authority hashIf using an internal Certificate Authority, check the CA certificate hash algorithm using 'openssl x509 -in <ca.pem> -noout -text' on the certificate authority certificateAffected if The CA certificate was signed using MD5, making any issued server certificates vulnerable to collision attacks
You are affected if any of the identified product versions match the vulnerable versions AND the certificates in use are signed with the weak MD5 hash algorithm.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the vendor-supplied patches: SP7 Patch 9 for iManager 2.7, version 3.0.2.1 for iManager 3.x, SP8 Patch 9 Hotfix 2 for eDirectory 8.8.x, and Hotfix 2 (9.0.2.2) for eDirectory 9.x. Consider re-issuing affected certificates with stronger hash algorithms post-patch.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-5186 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-5186 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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