CVE-2017-6230
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedRuckus Networks Solo APs firmware releases R110.x or before and Ruckus Networks SZ managed APs firmware releases R5.x or before contain authenticated Root Command Injection in the web-GUI that could allow authenticated valid users to execute privileged commands on the respective systems.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAuthenticated root command injection vulnerability in Ruckus Solo AP and SZ managed AP web-GUI allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges due to improper input validation when passing user-supplied data to system shell calls.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= r110.0<= r5.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify device model and firmware versionAccess the device CLI or web-GUI and locate the firmware version information, typically found in System Info or About sectionsAffected if The firmware version is Solo AP <= r110.0 or Smartzone managed AP <= r5.0
-
Confirm web-GUI access is enabledCheck device configuration for web-based management interface status, usually via CLI command 'show running-config' or through the web-GUI status pageAffected if The web-GUI administrative interface is enabled and reachable
-
Verify user authentication is configuredCheck for existing administrative accounts in the web-GUI user management section or via CLI command 'show admin users'Affected if There is at least one user account configured with web-GUI access privileges
-
Assess network exposure of management interfaceReview network configuration to determine if the web-GUI is accessible from untrusted networks, typically by checking interface bindings and access control listsAffected if The web-GUI is accessible from network segments outside the trusted administrative network
-
Check for suspicious user accounts or commandsReview system logs and user account lists for unknown administrative users or unexpected command executions in the device logsAffected if Unknown administrative accounts exist or there are indicators of unauthorized command execution
A user is affected if they are running Solo AP firmware <= r110.0 or Smartzone managed AP firmware <= r5.0 with the web-GUI interface enabled and accessible to authenticated users.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Solo AP firmware to versions newer than R110.x and SZ managed APs to versions newer than R5.x. Alternatively, restrict web-GUI access to trusted administrative users only and segment affected devices on isolated management networks until patching is possible.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,560.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-6230 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-6230 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data