CVE-2017-8214
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHonor 8,Honor V8,Honor 9,Honor V9,Nova 2,Nova 2 Plus,P9,P10 Plus,Toronto Huawei smart phones with software of versions earlier than FRD-AL00C00B391, versions earlier than FRD-DL00C00B391, versions earlier than KNT-AL10C00B391, versions earlier than KNT-AL20C00B391, versions earlier than KNT-UL10C00B391, versions earlier than KNT-TL10C00B391, versions earlier than Stanford-AL00C00B175, versions earlier than Stanford-AL10C00B175, versions earlier than Stanford-TL00C01B175, versions earlier than Duke-AL20C00B191, versions earlier than Duke-TL30C01B191, versions earlier than Picasso-AL00C00B162, versions earlier than Picasso-TL00C01B162 , versions earlier than Barca-AL00C00B162, versions earlier than Barca-TL00C00B162, versions earlier than EVA-AL10C00B396SP03, versions earlier than EVA-CL00C92B396, versions earlier than EVA-DL00C17B396, versions earlier than EVA-TL00C01B396 , versions earlier than Vicky-AL00AC00B172, versions earlier than Toronto-AL00AC00B191, versions earlier than Toronto-TL10C01B191 have an unlock code verification bypassing vulnerability. An attacker with the root privilege of a mobile can exploit this vulnerability to bypass the unlock code verification and unlock the mobile phone bootloader.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMultiple Huawei/Honor smartphones contain a bootloader unlock code verification bypass vulnerability. An attacker with root privileges can exploit this to bypass the unlock code verification and unlock the device bootloader, potentially exposing user data and enabling further compromise.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< frd-al00c00b391< frd-dl00c00b391< knt-al10c00b391< knt-al20c00b391< knt-ul10c00b391< knt-tl10c00b391< stanford-al00c00b175< stanford-al10c00b175< stanford-tl00c01b175< duke-al20c00b191< duke-tl30c01b191< picasso-al00c00b162< picasso-tl00c01b162< barca-al00c00b162< barca-tl00c00b162< eva-al10c00b396sp03< eva-cl00c92b396< eva-dl00c17b396< eva-tl00c01b396< vicky-al00ac00b172CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the exact device model numberGo to Settings > About Phone > Model Number, or check the physical device label/boxingAffected if The model is not one of the affected products (Honor 8, Honor V8, Honor 9, Honor V9, Nova 2, Nova 2 Plus, P9, P10 Plus)
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Retrieve the current firmware versionGo to Settings > About Phone > Build Number or Version; alternatively, access the engineering menu via *#*#2846579#*#* and navigate to ProjectMenu > VersionAffected if Unable to retrieve firmware version for comparison
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Compare firmware version against affected rangesMatch your firmware build ID (e.g., frd-al00c00b391) against the listed thresholds for your specific model; the device is affected if the version is lower than the threshold values provided in the CVEAffected if Firmware version is below any of the threshold values listed for your specific model (e.g., Honor 8 < frd-al00c00b391, P9 < eva-al10c00b396sp03, etc.)
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Verify if root access exists on the deviceCheck if a root management app (SuperSU, Magisk) is present, or attempt to run 'su' command in a terminal emulator; also check if apps request root permissionsAffected if Root privileges are present - this is required for the exploit to work, though the vulnerability still exists in unpatched firmware regardless of current root state
The device is affected if it matches one of the listed models AND its firmware version is below the specified threshold, regardless of whether root is currently obtained.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-provided software updates (firmware versions at or later than those listed in the CVE description) to all affected devices. Users should not root their devices or grant root access to untrusted applications.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-8214 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-8214 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data