CVE-2017-9132
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA hard-coded credentials issue was discovered on Mimosa Client Radios before 2.2.3, Mimosa Backhaul Radios before 2.2.3, and Mimosa Access Points before 2.2.3. These devices run Mosquitto, a lightweight message broker, to send information between devices. By using the vendor's hard-coded credentials to connect to the broker on any device (whether it be an AP, Client, or Backhaul model), an attacker can view all the messages being sent between the devices. If an attacker connects to an AP, the AP will leak information about any clients connected to it, including the serial numbers, which can be used to remotely factory reset the clients via a page in their web interface.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMimosa wireless devices (Client Radios, Backhaul Radios, and Access Points) contain hard-coded credentials for the embedded Mosquitto MQTT broker. An attacker with these credentials can connect to the broker and intercept all device-to-device communications, including sensitive client information such as serial numbers. This information can then be used to perform remote factory resets via the web interface.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2.2.1<= 2.2.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Mimosa devices on your networkScan your network for Mimosa Backhaul Radios or Client Radios by reviewing device inventories, DHCP lease tables, or performing network discovery. Look for devices with Mimosa MAC address prefixes or device hostnames containing 'mimosa'.Affected if Mimosa Backhaul Radios or Client Radios exist on the network and are running vulnerable firmware.
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Check the firmware version of Mimosa devicesAccess each Mimosa device through its web interface or CLI and retrieve the firmware version. This is typically found in the device status page or via the 'show version' command in CLI.Affected if The firmware version is 2.2.1 or lower, indicating the hard-coded MQTT credentials are present.
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Verify MQTT broker accessibilityFrom systems on the same network segment as the Mimosa devices, attempt to connect to the MQTT broker port (default 1883) on each device's IP address using a tool like nmap or netcat: 'nmap -p 1883 <device_ip>' or telnet to port 1883.Affected if Port 1883 is open and accessible from untrusted network segments, allowing an attacker to reach the MQTT broker.
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Inspect for unauthorized MQTT client connectionsIf you have legitimate access to the MQTT broker (e.g., via a managed instance), query connected clients using 'mosquitto_sub' or an MQTT client tool with authentication. Look for unexpected client IDs or connections from unauthorized IP addresses.Affected if Unknown or unexpected MQTT clients are connected to the broker, indicating potential exploitation.
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Check for suspicious factory reset activityReview web interface access logs, authentication logs, or network traffic for patterns of factory reset requests (POST to /reset or similar endpoints) originating from unexpected sources or at unusual times.Affected if Factory reset commands have been issued without legitimate admin action, which may indicate the credentials were used to intercept device information and perform unauthorized resets.
You are affected if you have Mimosa Backhaul Radios or Client Radios running firmware version 2.2.1 or lower, and the MQTT broker on port 1883 is accessible from network segments where untrusted users reside.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade all affected Mimosa devices to firmware version 2.2.3 or later to remove the hard-coded credentials. Additionally, implement network segmentation to restrict unauthorized access to the MQTT broker and monitor for unauthorized connections.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-9132 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-9132 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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