CVE-2018-0280
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) bitstream processing of the Cisco Meeting Server could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation of incoming RTP bitstreams. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted RTP bitstream to an affected Cisco Meeting Server. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to deny audio and video services by causing media process crashes resulting in a DoS condition on the affected product. This vulnerability affects Cisco Meeting Server deployments that are running Cisco Meeting Server Software Releases 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCve79693, CSCvf91393, CSCvg64656, CSCvh30725, CSCvi86363.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA vulnerability in the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) bitstream processing of Cisco Meeting Server allows unauthenticated remote attackers to send crafted RTP packets to affected systems. Due to insufficient input validation of incoming RTP bitstreams, the attacker can trigger media process crashes, resulting in denial of audio and video services. The vulnerability affects Cisco Meeting Server software releases 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2.0= 2.1= 2.2= 2.2.5= 2.2.8= 2.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Cisco Meeting Server installationCheck if Cisco Meeting Server is running on the system. Look for processes related to meeting server, call bridge, or media processing. On the CMS command line, use 'show version' or check running processes.Affected if Cisco Meeting Server software is installed and running
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Check installed version against affected releasesOn the Cisco Meeting Server, run the command to display the software version (typically 'cms' or 'show version' in the admin CLI). Compare the version number to the affected list: 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.5, 2.2.8, or 2.3.Affected if The installed version is any of: 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.5, 2.2.8, or 2.3
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Verify RTP service is enabled and exposedCheck if the RTP media service is enabled and accessible. By default, Cisco Meeting Server uses UDP ports in the range 16384-32767 for RTP media. Verify if these ports are listening and accessible from network vantage points.Affected if RTP media ports (typically UDP 16384-32767) are open and listening on the system
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Inspect for media process crashes or service disruptionsReview system logs, call bridge logs, and any media process logs for sudden crashes, restarts, or anomalies in audio/video streams. Check for repeated media process failures.Affected if Media processes are crashing repeatedly or audio/video services are intermittently unavailable with no other explanation
You are affected if Cisco Meeting Server versions 2.0 through 2.3 are installed, RTP media ports are exposed, and media process crashes are occurring.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to a Cisco Meeting Server software version beyond 2.3 that includes the fix, or apply vendor-supplied patches if available. Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of the RTP ports to untrusted networks.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-0280 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-0280 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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