CVE-2018-11482
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · unedited/usr/lib/lua/luci/websys.lua on TP-LINK IPC TL-IPC223(P)-6, TL-IPC323K-D, TL-IPC325(KP)-*, and TL-IPC40A-4 devices has a hardcoded zMiVw8Kw0oxKXL0 password.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceTP-LINK IP camera devices (TL-IPC223(P)-6, TL-IPC323K-D, TL-IPC325(KP)-*, TL-IPC40A-4) contain a hardcoded password 'zMiVw8Kw0oxKXL0' embedded in the /usr/lib/lua/luci/websys.lua web system file. This hardcoded credential allows remote attackers to authenticate to the device's web interface without knowing the actual user-defined password.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.0.21< 1.0.21< 1.0.21< 1.0.21CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelAccess the device management interface or check the physical device label to confirm the exact model number (e.g., TL-IPC223(P)-6, TL-IPC323K-D, TL-IPC325(KP)-*, or TL-IPC40A-4)Affected if The device matches any of the four affected model families listed in the CVE
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Check the firmware versionLog into the device web interface and navigate to the System or Settings page to view the firmware version, or use the manufacturer's management tool to query the device firmware versionAffected if The firmware version is less than 1.0.21
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Inspect the hardcoded credential fileIf you have shell access to the device (via SSH or Telnet), examine the file /usr/lib/lua/luci/websys.lua and search for the string 'zMiVw8Kw0oxKXL0'Affected if The file contains the hardcoded password 'zMiVw8Kw0oxKXL0'
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Verify web interface accessibilityConfirm that the device web management interface is reachable on the network (typically on port 80 or 443)Affected if The web interface is exposed and the hardcoded credential is present in the firmware
The environment is affected if the device is one of the four TP-LINK IP camera models running firmware version below 1.0.21 and the hardcoded password exists in the websys.lua file.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.0.21
Apply vendor firmware updates if available. If no patch exists, implement network segmentation to isolate affected devices, restrict management interface access to trusted IPs only, and consider replacing end-of-life devices. Monitor for unauthorized access attempts.
Firmware version 1.0.21 or later for TL-IPC223(P)-6, TL-IPC323K-D, TL-IPC325(KP), and TL-IPC40A-4
- 1. Identify the specific TP-LINK IPC camera model (TL-IPC223(P)-6, TL-IPC323K-D, TL-IPC325(KP), or TL-IPC40A-4) from the affected device list
- 2. Access the device's web interface or management console
- 3. Navigate to the firmware upgrade section (typically under System > Firmware Upgrade or Settings > Device > Upgrade)
- 4. Download the firmware version 1.0.21 or later from the official TP-LINK support website for the specific model
- 5. Upload the firmware file to the device and initiate the upgrade process
- 6. Wait for the device to reboot and complete the upgrade
- 7. After reboot, verify the firmware version has been updated to 1.0.21 or higher
- 8. Change any default credentials immediately after upgrade to unique, strong passwords
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-11482 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-11482 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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