CVE-2018-11490
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe DGifDecompressLine function in dgif_lib.c in GIFLIB (possibly version 3.0.x), as later shipped in cgif.c in sam2p 0.49.4, has a heap-based buffer overflow because a certain "Private->RunningCode - 2" array index is not checked. This will lead to a denial of service or possibly unspecified other impact.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceHeap-based buffer overflow in GIFLIB's DGifDecompressLine function in dgif_lib.c (also affecting sam2p 0.49.4). The vulnerability occurs because the array index 'Private->RunningCode - 2' is not validated before use, allowing out-of-bounds memory access during GIF decompression.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 10.0= 16.04= 18.04= 19.04>= 3.0, <= 3.1.1= 0.49.4CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if GIFLIB library is installed and its versionRun 'dpkg -l | grep giflib' (Debian/Ubuntu) or 'rpm -qa | grep giflib' (RHEL/CentOS) to list installed giflib packages, or check the shared library version with 'ldconfig -p | grep gif' and then 'giflib-config --version' if availableAffected if The installed version is between 3.0 and 3.1.1 inclusive (versions prior to the bounds-checking fix)
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Check if sam2p is installed and its versionRun 'dpkg -l | grep sam2p' (Debian/Ubuntu) or 'rpm -qa | grep sam2p' (RHEL/CentOS) to list installed sam2p packages, or check 'sam2p --version' if the binary existsAffected if The installed sam2p version is exactly 0.49.4
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Identify applications or tools that link to the vulnerable giflib libraryUse 'ldd /path/to/binary | grep gif' or 'ldconfig -p | grep gif' to find executables that load libgif.so, or check for image processing tools that depend on giflib (such as ImageMagick, feh, or other GIF-handling utilities)Affected if Any application that uses the DGifDecompressLine function from an affected giflib version is potentially vulnerable when decompressing specially crafted GIF files
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Confirm the dgif_lib.c source code version if giflib is built from sourceInspect the dgif_lib.c file in the source tree and search for the DGifDecompressLine function, specifically looking for the use of 'Private->RunningCode - 2' as an array index without bounds validationAffected if The source code lacks bounds checking on the RunningCode index before array access in the DGifDecompressLine function
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Check for GIF processing in server or web-facing applicationsIdentify any web applications, image processing services, or automated tools that accept user-uploaded GIF files and use giflib or sam2p for decompressionAffected if User-supplied GIF files can be processed by a vulnerable version of giflib or sam2p, triggering the heap buffer overflow
You are affected if giflib version 3.0 through 3.1.1 or sam2p version 0.49.4 is installed and processes untrusted GIF files, as the missing bounds check on the RunningCode index allows heap-based buffer overflow during decompression.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to a patched version of GIFLIB that adds proper bounds checking on the RunningCode index before array access. For sam2p, update to version 0.49.5 or later if available, or apply the same bounds-checking fix to the cgif.c code.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-11490 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-11490 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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