Emc Solutions Enabler Virtual ApplianceApplication · Dell

CVE-2018-1216

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-03-08
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 8.4.0.18 / 8.4.0.21 or later.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A hard-coded password vulnerability was discovered in vApp Manager which is embedded in Dell EMC Unisphere for VMAX, Dell EMC Solutions Enabler, Dell EMC VASA Virtual Appliances, and Dell EMC VMAX Embedded Management (eManagement): Dell EMC Unisphere for VMAX Virtual Appliance versions prior to 8.4.0.18, Dell EMC Solutions Enabler Virtual Appliance versions prior to 8.4.0.21, Dell EMC VASA Virtual Appliance versions prior to 8.4.0.514, and Dell EMC VMAX Embedded Management (eManagement) versions prior to and including 1.4 (Enginuity Release 5977.1125.1125 and earlier). They contain an undocumented default account (smc) with a hard-coded password that may be used with certain web servlets. A remote attacker with the knowledge of the hard-coded password and the message format may use vulnerable servlets to gain unauthorized access to the system. Note: This account cannot be used to log in via the web user interface.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Hard-coded password vulnerability in vApp Manager embedded in Dell EMC Unisphere for VMAX, Solutions Enabler, VASA Virtual Appliances, and VMAX eManagement. An undocumented default account (smc) with a static password can be used with certain web servlets to gain unauthorized remote access. The account is not usable via the web UI but is exploitable via servlet interfaces.

MitigationApply vendor patches: Unisphere for VMAX to 8.4.0.18+, Solutions Enabler to 8.4.0.21+, VASA to 8.4.0.514+, and VMAX eManagement to versions after 1.4. Alternatively, disable or restrict access to the vulnerable servlets if patching is not immediately feasible.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Emc Solutions Enabler Virtual ApplianceApplication
Affected:< 8.4.0.21
Emc Unisphere For Vmax Virtual ApplianceApplication
Affected:< 8.4.0.18
Emc Vasa Virtual ApplianceApplication
Affected:< 8.4.0.514
Emc Vmax Embedded ManagementApplication
Affected:<= 1.4

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the installed Dell EMC product
    Log into the virtual appliance and run: cat /etc/*release or ls -la /opt/emc* to determine which product is deployed (Solutions Enabler, Unisphere for VMAX, VASA, or VMAX eManagement)
    Affected if Any of the four affected products is running
  2. Check the installed version
    Run: /opt/emc/symcli/bin/symcli -version for Solutions Enabler, or check the web UI version page for Unisphere/VASA. For VMAX eManagement, check: cat /opt/vmaxe/version
    Affected if Version is below 8.4.0.21 (Solutions Enabler), below 8.4.0.18 (Unisphere), below 8.4.0.514 (VASA), or 1.4 or earlier (VMAX eManagement)
  3. Verify if the smc account exists
    Run: grep smc /etc/passwd or id smc to check if the smc user account is present on the system
    Affected if The smc user account exists on the system (account is exploitable via servlet interfaces even if not usable via web UI)
  4. Confirm servlet accessibility
    Check if the vApp Manager servlets are exposed. Review web server configuration files in /opt/apache/tomcat*/conf or equivalent, and verify network access to servlet endpoints on port 8443 or 443
    Affected if The servlet interfaces are network-accessible and the smc account is present

A user is affected if they are running any of the four products with a version matching the affected ranges AND the smc account exists on the system with accessible servlet interfaces.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 8.4.0.18 / 8.4.0.21 / 8.4.0.514 or later
Fixed in 8.4.0.188.4.0.218.4.0.514
Interim mitigation

Apply vendor patches: Unisphere for VMAX to 8.4.0.18+, Solutions Enabler to 8.4.0.21+, VASA to 8.4.0.514+, and VMAX eManagement to versions after 1.4. Alternatively, disable or restrict access to the vulnerable servlets if patching is not immediately feasible.

Recommended fix High confidence

Solutions Enabler >= 8.4.0.21, Unisphere for VMAX >= 8.4.0.18, VASA >= 8.4.0.514, VMAX Embedded Management > 1.4

  1. Identify the specific EMC product in use: Solutions Enabler Virtual Appliance, Unisphere for VMAX Virtual Appliance, VASA Virtual Appliance, or VMAX Embedded Management
  2. For Solutions Enabler Virtual Appliance: upgrade to version 8.4.0.21 or later
  3. For Unisphere for VMAX Virtual Appliance: upgrade to version 8.4.0.18 or later
  4. For VASA Virtual Appliance: upgrade to version 8.4.0.514 or later
  5. For VMAX Embedded Management (eManagement): upgrade to a version greater than 1.4
  6. After upgrading, verify the undocumented smc account has been removed or the hard-coded password has been changed
  7. Consult Dell EMC support documentation for specific upgrade procedures and backup requirements
Caveat Upgrading virtual appliances may require downtime and proper backup of configuration data; test upgrade in non-production environment first

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Emc Solutions Enabler Virtual Appliance Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
20.0 hours of engineering $3,500
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-1216 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-1216 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data