dbcve.org
RichfacesApplication · Redhat

CVE-2018-12533

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-06-18
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 3.3.4 or later.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
JBoss RichFaces 3.1.0 through 3.3.4 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to inject expression language (EL) expressions and execute arbitrary Java code via a /DATA/ substring in a path with an org.richfaces.renderkit.html.Paint2DResource$ImageData object, aka RF-14310.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

JBoss RichFaces versions 3.1.0 through 3.3.4 contain an EL (Expression Language) injection vulnerability allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary Java code. The flaw is triggered via a specific path pattern containing /DATA/ and the org.richfaces.renderkit.html.Paint2DResource$ImageData object, enabling complete system compromise without authentication.

MitigationUpgrade to a patched version of RichFaces beyond 3.3.4; if upgrade is not feasible, implement network-level access controls to block external access to the vulnerable /DATA/ endpoint and consider deploying a WAF with rules to block EL injection patterns.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
RichfacesApplication
Affected:>= 3.1.0, <= 3.3.4

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify RichFaces version
    Locate RichFaces JAR files (richfaces-*.jar) in your application deployment (WEB-INF/lib directory for web apps, or your lib folder for standalone). Check the MANIFEST.MF file inside each JAR for the Implementation-Version attribute. Also review your build configuration (pom.xml, build.gradle, or similar) for richfaces dependencies and their declared versions.
    Affected if The discovered version falls within >= 3.1.0 and <= 3.3.4
  2. Check for vulnerable component presence
    Search your deployed application files for the class org.richfaces.renderkit.html.Paint2DResource. This may appear in JAR files, compiled classes, or referenced in application configuration. Use a file search for 'Paint2DResource' across your deployment directory.
    Affected if The Paint2DResource class is present in your deployment
  3. Verify /DATA/ endpoint exposure
    Inspect your application web.xml descriptor (WEB-INF/web.xml) for servlet mappings that expose the /DATA/ path pattern. Also check if your application server routing configuration allows URLs containing '/DATA/' to reach RichFaces components. Test by attempting a request to a path like /DATA/anything in your environment.
    Affected if The /DATA/ path pattern is mapped and accessible to unauthenticated users
  4. Check application configuration for RichFaces resources
    Examine faces-config.xml, web.xml, and any RichFaces-specific configuration files for resource handler definitions. Look for org.richfaces.resource.ResourceHandler or similar RichFaces resource mappings that enable the vulnerable code path.
    Affected if RichFaces resource handlers are configured and enabled

You are affected if your RichFaces installation version is between 3.1.0 and 3.3.4 inclusive AND the /DATA/ endpoint is accessible AND the Paint2DResource component is present in your deployment.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 3.3.4
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to a patched version of RichFaces beyond 3.3.4; if upgrade is not feasible, implement network-level access controls to block external access to the vulnerable /DATA/ endpoint and consider deploying a WAF with rules to block EL injection patterns.

Recommended fix High confidence

Migrate to RichFaces 4.x/5.x or an alternative JSF component library (e.g., PrimeFaces). Note: RichFaces 3.x is end-of-lifed with no further releases.

  1. 1. RichFaces 3.x has reached end-of-life and no longer receives security patches. Plan migration to a supported JSF component library such as RichFaces 4.x/5.x (if available from vendor) or an alternative like PrimeFaces, OmniFaces, or ButterFaces.
  2. 2. Identify all usages of org.richfaces.renderkit.html.Paint2DResource and the /DATA/ endpoint in the application codebase.
  3. 3. Replace deprecated RichFaces components with equivalent components in the target migration framework.
  4. 4. Test all functionality thoroughly after migration, especially image rendering and resource handling that was previously handled by Paint2DResource.
  5. 5. If immediate migration is not possible, restrict access to the affected /DATA/ endpoints at the network level (e.g., firewall, reverse proxy) to prevent unauthenticated access.
  6. 6. Implement Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to detect and block EL injection attempts in request parameters.
  7. 7. After migration, verify the application is no longer vulnerable by testing with EL injection payloads in paths containing /DATA/.
Caveat Migration from RichFaces 3.x to 4.x or an alternative library requires code changes as API and component names differ significantly. Thorough regression testing is required.

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Richfaces Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing12.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
28.0 hours of engineering $4,760
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,616.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-12533 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-12533 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data