PbcApplication · Pbc Project

CVE-2018-12916

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-06-27
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 20170302 or later.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
In libpbc.a in PBC through 2017-03-02, there is a Segmentation fault in _pbcP_message_default in proto.c.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

A segmentation fault occurs in the _pbcP_message_default function in proto.c within libpbc.a of the PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography) library. This is a memory corruption or null pointer dereference issue that can cause a denial of service and may potentially be exploitable for code execution given the critical CVSS score.

MitigationUpgrade PBC library to a version after 2017-03-02 that includes the fix for this vulnerability. If patching is not feasible, review all code paths that call _pbcP_message_default and implement input validation or bounds checking to prevent the condition triggering the segfault.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
PbcApplication
Affected:<= 20170302

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify PBC library installation
    Locate the PBC library files on the system. Search for libpbc.a or libpbc.so files, or check for PBC source code directories. Common paths include /usr/lib/, /usr/local/lib/, or project dependencies.
    Affected if The PBC library (libpbc) is present on the system or embedded in an application
  2. Determine PBC library version
    Check the version of the installed PBC library. For source installations, examine version.h, configure.ac, or release tags. For installed packages, use package manager queries or check library metadata. Compare against the affected range: versions <= 20170302
    Affected if The installed PBC version is 20170302 or earlier
  3. Verify vulnerable function exists
    Inspect the PBC library or source code for the _pbcP_message_default function in proto.c. If source is available, check if the function is present. If only the compiled library exists, strings or nm commands can reveal the function symbol.
    Affected if The _pbcP_message_default function is present in the compiled library or source code
  4. Check for code paths using vulnerable function
    Review application or project code that links against PBC to identify any calls to functions that eventually invoke _pbcP_message_default. Search for message handling, proto.c usage, or PBC message API calls.
    Affected if Code paths exist that call into the vulnerable _pbcP_message_default function through the PBC message interface

The environment is affected if PBC library version 20170302 or earlier is installed and any code path exercises the _pbcP_message_default function in proto.c, causing a segmentation fault.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 20170302
Interim mitigation

Upgrade PBC library to a version after 2017-03-02 that includes the fix for this vulnerability. If patching is not feasible, review all code paths that call _pbcP_message_default and implement input validation or bounds checking to prevent the condition triggering the segfault.

Fix this in Pbc Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing12.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
28.0 hours of engineering $4,760
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,616.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-12916 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-12916 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data