CVE-2018-13327
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe transfer and transferFrom functions of a smart contract implementation for ChuCunLingAIGO (CCLAG), an Ethereum token, have an integer overflow. NOTE: this has been disputed by a third party.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe ChuCunLingAIGO (CCLAG) Ethereum token smart contract contains an integer overflow vulnerability in its transfer and transferFrom functions, allowing manipulation of token balances through arithmetic operations that exceed maximum integer limits.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Locate CCLAG token contractSearch your blockchain or project for the ChuCunLingAIGO token contract - look for token symbol CCLAG, contract name Chucunlingaigo, or the token address if knownAffected if The CCLAG token contract is deployed in your environment
-
Verify contract identityConfirm the contract is the ChuCunLingAIGO (CCLAG) token by checking the contract name and symbol in the token contract metadataAffected if The contract matches the Chucunlingaigo token from the Chucunlingaigo Project
-
Check for SafeMath library usageExamine the contract source code for 'SafeMath' import or 'using SafeMath for uint256;' statement - this library provides overflow-safe arithmetic methodsAffected if SafeMath is NOT imported or used in the contract code
-
Inspect transfer functions for unchecked arithmeticReview the transfer() and transferFrom() functions in the source code - look for direct arithmetic operators (+, -, *, /) on uint256 token balances instead of SafeMath methods (.add, .sub, .mul, .div)Affected if Transfer functions use direct arithmetic operators without SafeMath overflow checks
Your environment is affected if the ChuCunLingAIGO token contract is deployed without SafeMath protection and contains direct unchecked arithmetic operations in transfer or transferFrom functions.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace vulnerable arithmetic operations with safe math libraries (e.g., OpenZeppelin SafeMath) or implement explicit overflow/underflow checks before deploying updated contract. Consider upgrading to a tested ERC-20 implementation.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,080.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-13327 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-13327 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data