CVE-2018-13505
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe mintToken function of a smart contract implementation for ecogreenhouse, an Ethereum token, has an integer overflow that allows the owner of the contract to set the balance of an arbitrary user to any value.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe mintToken function in the ecogreenhouse Ethereum smart contract contains an integer overflow vulnerability that permits the contract owner to manipulate arbitrary user token balances to any value. This occurs due to lack of proper overflow validation in arithmetic operations within the minting function.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if you use the Ecogreenhouse smart contractSearch your deployed contracts or token holdings for the Ecogreenhouse contract address. Check blockchain explorers for any contracts named 'ecogreenhouse' or 'Ecogreenhouse' that you control or hold tokens from.Affected if You have deployed or interact with the Ecogreenhouse contract on any Ethereum network.
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Locate the mintToken function in the contractRetrieve the contract source code from Etherscan or your deployment records. Search for a function named 'mintToken' within the contract code.Affected if The contract source code contains a function named 'mintToken' that performs token minting operations.
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Verify SafeMath usage in the minting functionExamine the mintToken function implementation. Look specifically at any arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication) inside the function. Check if they use SafeMath library functions (such as add, sub, mul) or include explicit overflow checks.Affected if The arithmetic operations in mintToken use raw operators (+, -, *) without SafeMath or explicit overflow validation.
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Determine contract ownership statusCheck if your Ethereum address is the owner of the Ecogreenhouse contract by calling the owner() function or inspecting the contract's ownership state variable.Affected if You are the contract owner, meaning you have the capability to exploit the vulnerability (the vulnerability can only be triggered by the contract owner).
You are affected if you have deployed or hold tokens from the Ecogreenhouse contract and it contains an unprotected mintToken function using raw arithmetic operators, regardless of whether exploitation has occurred.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace unsafe arithmetic operations with SafeMath library functions or implement explicit overflow/underflow checks to validate all calculations before state modifications. Consider redeploying the contract with corrected logic and migrating affected balances.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,656.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-13505 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-13505 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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