CVE-2018-14987
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe MXQ TV Box 4.4.2 Android device with a build fingerprint of MBX/m201_N/m201_N:4.4.2/KOT49H/20160106:user/test-keys contains the Android framework with a package name of android (versionCode=19, versionName=4.4.2-20170213) that dynamically registers a broadcast receiver app component named com.android.server.MasterClearReceiver instead of statically registering it in the AndroidManifest.xml file of the core Android package, as done in Android Open Source Project (AOSP) code for Android 4.4.2. The dynamic-registration of the MasterClearReceiver broadcast receiver app component is not protected with the android.permission.MASTER_CLEAR permission during registration, so any app co-located on the device, even those without any permissions, can programmatically initiate a factory reset of the device. A factory reset will remove all user data and apps from the device. This will result in the loss of any data that have not been backed up or synced externally. The capability to perform a factory reset is not directly available to third-party apps (those that the user installs themselves with the exception of enabled Mobile Device Management (MDM) apps), although this capability can be obtained by leveraging an unprotected app component of core Android process.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe MXQ TV Box 4.4.2 contains a misconfigured MasterClearReceiver broadcast receiver that is dynamically registered without the android.permission.MASTER_CLEAR permission protection. Unlike AOSP Android 4.4.2 which statically registers this receiver in AndroidManifest.xml with proper permission enforcement, this device allows any local application—even those with no permissions—to trigger a factory reset by sending a broadcast to this unprotected component, resulting in complete data loss.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4.4.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelCheck the device settings or system information to confirm the device is an MXQ TV Box. Look under Settings > About Device or Settings > System for the model name.Affected if The device model is not an MXQ TV Box (this CVE only affects that specific device).
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Check the firmware versionNavigate to Settings > About Device > Firmware Version or Settings > System > Build Number to determine the installed Android firmware version.Affected if The firmware version is not exactly 4.4.2 (this specific vulnerability is tied to version 4.4.2).
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Verify the MasterClearReceiver configurationAnalyze the system framework or settings app APK (typically Settings.apk or framework-res.apk) using APK decompilation tools. Inspect the AndroidManifest.xml or look for dynamic broadcast receiver registration code for the MasterClearReceiver component.Affected if The MasterClearReceiver is dynamically registered without the android.permission.MASTER_CLEAR permission requirement, or the receiver does not enforce any permission check before performing factory reset.
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Test if unprotected factory reset is possibleCompile and run a minimal Android application with no special permissions that sends a broadcast intent to the MasterClearReceiver component (typically android.intent.action.MASTER_CLEAR). Monitor whether the device initiates a factory reset.Affected if The device performs a factory reset in response to a broadcast from an application lacking the MASTER_CLEAR permission, confirming the vulnerability is exploitable.
A user is affected if they have an MXQ TV Box running firmware exactly version 4.4.2 where the MasterClearReceiver accepts broadcasts without requiring the MASTER_CLEAR permission, allowing any app to trigger factory reset.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRemedy this by modifying the Android framework to either statically register MasterClearReceiver in AndroidManifest.xml with the MASTER_CLEAR permission requirement, or implement proper permission checks during dynamic registration to enforce authorization before allowing factory reset operations.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-14987 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-14987 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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