dbcve.org
V7 FirmwareOperating system · Vivo

CVE-2018-15000

MEDIUM · 6.3 CVSS v3.0 Published 2019-04-25
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
65/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Vivo V7 Android device with a build fingerprint of vivo/1718/1718:7.1.2/N2G47H/compil11021857:user/release-keys contains a platform app with a package name of com.vivo.smartshot (versionCode=1, versionName=3.0.0). This app contains an exported service named com.vivo.smartshot.ui.service.ScreenRecordService that will record the screen for 60 minutes and write the mp4 file to a location of the user's choosing. Normally, a recording notification will be visible to the user, but we discovered an approach to make it mostly transparent to the user by quickly removing a notification and floating icon. The user can see a floating icon and notification appear and disappear quickly due to quickly stopping and restarting the service with different parameters that do not interfere with the ongoing screen recording. The screen recording lasts for 60 minutes and can be written directly to the attacking app's private directory.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Vivo V7 Android device contains a pre-installed platform app (com.vivo.smartshot v3.0.0) with an exported service (ScreenRecordService) that can be invoked by any application on the device. This service allows screen recording for up to 60 minutes and can write the resulting MP4 file to an attacker's private directory. While the service normally displays a notification, attackers can bypass this by rapidly stopping and restarting the service with different parameters, making the recording nearly invisible to the user.

MitigationThe service should either be set to not exported in the AndroidManifest.xml, or should implement proper permission checks to verify the caller's identity before allowing screen recording to proceed.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
V7 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
High
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify device model
    Check if the device is a Vivo V7 by running 'getprop ro.product.model' or checking Settings > About Phone > Model Number
    Affected if Device model is Vivo V7 (all firmware versions)
  2. Verify com.vivo.smartshot app presence
    Check if the app is installed by running 'pm list packages | grep smartshot' or 'dumpsys package com.vivo.smartshot'
    Affected if Package com.vivo.smartshot exists on the device (version 3.0.0 is the known affected version)
  3. Check if ScreenRecordService is exported
    Decompile the APK (from /system/priv-app/SmartShot or /system/app/SmartShot) and inspect AndroidManifest.xml for <service android:name="ScreenRecordService" android:exported="true">
    Affected if ScreenRecordService has android:exported="true" or no android:exported attribute (defaults to true)
  4. Verify no permission enforcement on the service
    Inspect the service code (ScreenRecordService.smali or .java) to check if it validates the caller's identity or package name before allowing screen recording
    Affected if The service does not implement permission checks (e.g., checkCallingPermission, signature check, or whitelist of allowed callers)

A user is affected if they have a Vivo V7 device with com.vivo.smartshot installed and the ScreenRecordService is exported without permission validation.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

The service should either be set to not exported in the AndroidManifest.xml, or should implement proper permission checks to verify the caller's identity before allowing screen recording to proceed.

Fix this in V7 Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation8.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing12.0 h
  • Review / QA8.0 h
44.0 hours of engineering $7,720
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-15000 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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