Meeting ServerApplication · Cisco
CVE-2018-15446
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in Cisco Meeting Server could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain access to sensitive information. The vulnerability is due to improper protections on data that is returned from user meeting requests when the Guest access via ID and passcode option is set to Legacy mode. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending meeting requests to an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to determine the values of meeting room unique identifiers, possibly allowing the attacker to conduct further exploits.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceCisco Meeting Server has an information disclosure vulnerability where improper protections on data returned from user meeting requests in Legacy guest access mode allows unauthenticated remote attackers to determine meeting room unique identifiers. The vulnerability exists specifically when the 'Guest access via ID and passcode' setting is configured to Legacy mode, causing sensitive meeting identifiers to be exposed in meeting request responses.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Meeting ServerApplication
all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Verify Cisco Meeting Server installationIdentify if Cisco Meeting Server is deployed in your environment by checking running services, installed packages, or network services listening on typical CMS ports (HTTPS typically on 443, 8443)Affected if Cisco Meeting Server is present and running
-
Locate Guest access configurationAccess the Cisco Meeting Server admin interface or configuration settings and navigate to the 'Guest access via ID and passcode' settings panelAffected if You can access the Guest access configuration panel
-
Check Legacy mode settingExamine the 'Guest access via ID and passcode' setting and determine whether it is configured to 'Legacy mode' or an alternative modern authentication methodAffected if The setting shows 'Legacy mode' is enabled
-
Test meeting request responseSend an unauthenticated meeting request to the CMS server (such as accessing a meeting room via guest access without credentials) and inspect the HTTP response for exposed unique meeting identifiersAffected if The response contains meeting room unique identifiers or GUIDs that should not be visible to unauthenticated users
-
Assess network exposureDetermine if the Cisco Meeting Server guest access endpoint is accessible from untrusted networks (internet-facing or from network segments without authentication barriers)Affected if Legacy guest access is exposed to unauthenticated/untrusted network access
A user is affected if Cisco Meeting Server is running with 'Guest access via ID and passcode' configured in Legacy mode, allowing unauthenticated attackers to retrieve meeting room unique identifiers from responses.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable Legacy mode for 'Guest access via ID and passcode' and use modern authentication methods, or apply Cisco's patch when available. If Legacy mode is required, implement additional network-level access controls to limit meeting server exposure.
Fix this in Meeting Server
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,152.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-15446 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-15446 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data