SambaApplication

CVE-2018-16853

MEDIUM · 5.9 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-11-28
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 4.7.12 / 4.8.7 or later.
See remediation →
68/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Samba from version 4.7.0 has a vulnerability that allows a user in a Samba AD domain to crash the KDC when Samba is built in the non-default MIT Kerberos configuration. With this advisory the Samba Team clarify that the MIT Kerberos build of the Samba AD DC is considered experimental. Therefore the Samba Team will not issue security patches for this configuration. Additionally, Samba 4.7.12, 4.8.7 and 4.9.3 have been issued as security releases to prevent building of the AD DC with MIT Kerberos unless --with-experimental-mit-ad-dc is specified to the configure command.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Samba versions 4.7.0 through 4.7.11, 4.8.0 through 4.8.6, and 4.9.0 through 4.9.2 contain a vulnerability in the MIT Kerberos configuration of the AD DC where an authenticated domain user can cause a denial of service by crashing the KDC service.

MitigationEnsure Samba AD DC is not built with the experimental MIT Kerberos configuration; upgrade to 4.7.12, 4.8.7, 4.9.3 or later which disables MIT Kerberos AD DC builds by default unless explicitly enabled with --with-experimental-mit-ad-dc.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
SambaApplication
Affected:>= 4.7.0, < 4.7.12>= 4.8.0, < 4.8.7>= 4.9.0, < 4.9.3

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check Samba version
    Run 'samba --version' or check installed package version (e.g., dpkg -l samba, rpm -q samba)
    Affected if Version is 4.7.0 through 4.7.11, 4.8.0 through 4.8.6, or 4.9.0 through 4.9.2
  2. Verify Samba is running as AD DC
    Check smb.conf for 'server role = active directory domain controller' or check for 'samba' process running as DC (ps aux | grep samba)
    Affected if Samba is operating as an Active Directory Domain Controller
  3. Check if MIT Kerberos is enabled
    Review the Samba build configuration (e.g., check for --with-experimental-mit-ad-dc in build flags) or examine if the KDC is using MIT Kerberos libraries rather than Heimdal. This may require checking build scripts or binary linked libraries (ldd on samba binary)
    Affected if Samba AD DC is built or configured to use MIT Kerberos instead of the default Heimdal Kerberos
  4. Confirm KDC service is exposed
    Verify the KDC service (typically UDP port 88) is listening and accessible on the AD DC
    Affected if KDC service is running and accessible to authenticated domain users

A user is affected if their Samba version is in the affected range, the server is operating as an AD DC, and MIT Kerberos is enabled in the build or configuration.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to 4.7.12 / 4.8.7 / 4.9.3 or later
Fixed in 4.7.124.8.74.9.3
Interim mitigation

Ensure Samba AD DC is not built with the experimental MIT Kerberos configuration; upgrade to 4.7.12, 4.8.7, 4.9.3 or later which disables MIT Kerberos AD DC builds by default unless explicitly enabled with --with-experimental-mit-ad-dc.

Fix this in Samba Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
8.0 hours of engineering $1,420
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-16853 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data