CVE-2018-17924
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedRockwell Automation MicroLogix 1400 Controllers and 1756 ControlLogix Communications Modules An unauthenticated, remote threat actor could send a CIP connection request to an affected device, and upon successful connection, send a new IP configuration to the affected device even if the controller in the system is set to Hard RUN mode. When the affected device accepts this new IP configuration, a loss of communication occurs between the device and the rest of the system as the system traffic is still attempting to communicate with the device via the overwritten IP address.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send a CIP connection request to affected MicroLogix 1400 controllers or 1756 ControlLogix communication modules, and upon successful connection, inject a new IP configuration to the device even when the controller is set to Hard RUN mode. When the device accepts this malicious IP configuration, all system communication is disrupted because traffic continues attempting to reach the original IP address.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versions<= 10.10all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device model and firmware versionAccess the controller's web interface, RSLinx Classic, or use the controller's LCD display to determine the exact model number (e.g., MicroLogix 1400, 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1756-EN2F, 1756-EN2T) and firmware revision. For 1756 modules, check via ControlFLASH or the Logix chassis web page.Affected if The device is a MicroLogix 1400 (any firmware), or a 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB (Series A or B), 1756-EN2F (Series A, B, or Series C <= 10.10), or 1756-EN2T (Series A) communication module.
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Verify CIP communication is enabledCheck the communication module or controller settings via RSLinx Classic (communication setup > network browse) or the device web interface to confirm CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) services are active and the module is listening on CIP ports (typically 44818 for Ethernet/IP).Affected if CIP is enabled and the device accepts CIP connections from the network, which is the default vulnerable state for these modules.
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Confirm IP configuration method settingsExamine the controller or communication module IP configuration settings in RSLinx, the web interface, or BootP/DHCP server logs to determine if the device is configured to accept IP settings via CIP/ENET commands. For MicroLogix 1400, check the channel 1 configuration; for 1756 modules, check the network configuration settings.Affected if The device allows IP configuration changes via CIP/Network commands (this is the vulnerable setting that enables the attack).
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Review network logs for unexpected CIP IP change requestsMonitor network traffic or firewall logs for CIP Set Attribute Single messages targeting object 0xF5 (TCP/IP interface object) or inspect device syslogs if available. Look for CIP connections from unauthorized IP addresses that send IP configuration parameters.Affected if Unauthorized or unexpected CIP connections are observed attempting to modify IP configuration, or IP configuration has changed without authorized administrative action.
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Compare current IP configuration to baselineDocument the expected IP address, subnet mask, and gateway for the affected device. Verify the current IP settings match the baseline by pinging the device, checking DHCP/BootP logs, or reviewing switch ARP tables.Affected if The device IP address, subnet, or gateway has changed without authorized configuration, indicating possible exploitation.
A user is affected if they have any of the listed MicroLogix 1400 or 1756 communication modules on their network with CIP enabled and accepting IP configuration changes, especially if unauthorized IP change attempts are detected or the IP has unexpectedly changed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement network segmentation and firewall rules to restrict CIP traffic to authorized sources only, and apply vendor firmware updates when available. Consider disabling CIP-based IP configuration or implementing network monitoring for unexpected IP changes.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-17924 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-17924 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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