CVE-2018-19834
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe quaker function of a smart contract implementation for BOMBBA (BOMB), an tradable Ethereum ERC20 token, allows attackers to change the owner of the contract, because the function does not check the caller's identity.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe quaker function in the BOMBBA (BOMB) ERC20 token smart contract lacks an authorization check, allowing any external caller to change the contract owner. This is a missing access control vulnerability where the function does not verify the caller's identity before executing privileged operations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if you hold or interact with the BOMB tokenCheck your wallet or contract inventory for the BOMBBA (BOMB) ERC20 token. Verify the deployed contract address matches the known BOMB token contract.Affected if You hold BOMB tokens or have the BOMB token contract address in your deployment environment.
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Locate the quaker function in the contract sourceObtain the BOMB token contract source code (from Etherscan, GitHub, or your deployment artifacts). Search for a function named 'quaker' in the code.Affected if The quaker function exists in the deployed contract.
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Inspect the quaker function for access controlExamine the quaker function definition. Check if it contains 'require(msg.sender == owner)', 'require(owner == msg.sender)', 'onlyOwner' modifier, or any authorization check at the function entry.Affected if The quaker function has no require statement or modifier verifying the caller's identity.
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Verify the function is publicly executableConfirm the function is declared as 'public' or 'external' without additional constraints. Check the Solidity visibility specifier.Affected if The quaker function is publicly accessible without access restrictions.
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Test quaker function execution without owner privilegesUse a read-only call (eth_call in web3/ethers.js) to invoke the quaker function from a non-owner account. Observe if the call succeeds or returns without reverting.Affected if Calling quaker from a non-owner account succeeds without reverting.
You are affected if you have the BOMB token contract deployed and the quaker function executes without verifying that the caller is the contract owner.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataAdd an ownership verification check (e.g., require(msg.sender == owner) or an onlyOwner modifier) to the quaker function. Since smart contracts are immutable, this requires deploying a new fixed contract and migrating token holdings.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,408.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-19834 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-19834 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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