CVE-2018-5471
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information issue was discovered in Belden Hirschmann RS, RSR, RSB, MACH100, MACH1000, MACH4000, MS, and OCTOPUS Classic Platform Switches. A cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability in the web interface has been identified, which may allow an attacker to obtain sensitive information through a successful man-in-the-middle attack.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a cleartext transmission vulnerability in the web interface of Belden Hirschmann industrial switches (RS, RSR, RSB, MACH100, MACH1000, MACH4000, MS, and OCTOPUS Classic). Sensitive information is transmitted unencrypted over the network, allowing a man-in-the-middle attacker to intercept and read this data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Hirschmann switch modelAccess the device CLI or web interface and retrieve the exact model number (e.g., RS20 0900mmm2tdau, RS20 1600l2l2sdau, MACH4000, etc.)Affected if The model matches one of the affected products listed in the CVE (RS, RSR, RSB, MACH100, MACH1000, MACH4000, MS, OCTOPUS Classic families)
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Check if HTTP web interface is accessibleAttempt to connect to the device on port 80 (HTTP) using a browser or curl command: curl -I http://DEVICE_IPAffected if The device web interface responds on HTTP port 80 without automatic redirect to HTTPS
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Verify if HTTPS is enabled on the web interfaceAttempt to connect to the device on port 443 (HTTPS): curl -k -I https://DEVICE_IP. Also check the web interface settings page for SSL/TLS configuration options.Affected if HTTPS is either unavailable (connection fails) or disabled in the web interface settings
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Capture network traffic to verify cleartext transmissionUse a network sniffer (Wireshark, tcpdump) to capture traffic between the device and a client when accessing the web interface. Look for sensitive data (login credentials, configuration data) transmitted in plaintext over HTTP.Affected if Sensitive information such as username/password or configuration data is visible in cleartext in captured network packets
A user is affected if they use a Belden Hirschmann switch from the affected product families and the web interface is accessible over HTTP without encryption or does not enforce HTTPS for sensitive communications.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataEnable HTTPS/SSL/TLS encryption on the web interface and ensure all sensitive communications use secure protocols. Consider network segmentation to reduce MITM attack exposure.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-5471 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-5471 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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