CVE-2018-6018
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedFixed sizes of HTTPS responses in Tinder iOS app and Tinder Android app allow an attacker to extract private sensitive information by sniffing network traffic.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Tinder iOS and Android mobile applications transmit HTTPS responses with fixed/predictable sizes. This allows a network attacker performing traffic analysis (sniffing) to infer sensitive private information based on response payload lengths, even though the traffic is encrypted.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Tinder app is installedCheck your iOS device in Settings > General > iPhone Storage, or on Android go to Settings > Apps > Tinder. If Tinder is listed, the app is present on your device.Affected if Tinder app is installed on the device (all versions are affected)
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Identify installed Tinder version on iOSGo to Settings > General > iPhone Storage > Tinder. The version number is displayed under the app name.Affected if Any iOS version of Tinder is installed (all versions have the vulnerability)
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Identify installed Tinder version on AndroidOpen the Google Play Store, search for Tinder, tap on it, and view the version number under the app name. Alternatively, check Settings > Apps > Tinder > App info.Affected if Any Android version of Tinder is installed (all versions have the vulnerability)
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Verify vulnerability scopeThere is no version threshold to check against. The CVE explicitly states that ALL versions of the Tinder iOS and Android mobile applications are affected by predictable HTTPS response sizes.Affected if The installed version falls within any version range of Tinder (which is all versions)
If the Tinder mobile application is installed on your iOS or Android device, your HTTPS traffic from this app transmits response payloads with predictable sizes, allowing network observers to infer sensitive information from packet length analysis.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement dynamic response padding to randomize HTTPS response sizes, preventing traffic analysis attacks that infer sensitive data from packet sizes.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,960.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-6018 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-6018 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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