dbcve.org
66074 Mge Network Management Card TransverseHardware / appliance · Schneider Electric

CVE-2018-7246

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-04-18
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability exists in Schneider Electric's 66074 MGE Network Management Card Transverse installed in MGE UPS and MGE STS. he integrated web server (Port 80/443/TCP) of the affected devices could allow remote attackers to discover an administrative account. If default on device, it is not using a SSL in settings and if multiple request of the page "Access Control" (IP-address device/ups/pas_cont.htm) account data will be sent in cleartext

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The MGE Network Management Card's integrated web server transmits administrative credentials in cleartext when accessing the 'Access Control' page (IP-address/ups/pas_cont.htm) over HTTP. If SSL is not enabled in the device settings, an attacker performing multiple requests to this endpoint can intercept account data in plaintext, enabling unauthorized administrative access.

MitigationEnable SSL/TLS encryption on the affected device's web interface and ensure all administrative access occurs over HTTPS. Change default administrative credentials and consider network segmentation to limit exposure of the management interface.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
66074 Mge Network Management Card TransverseHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the Schneider Electric MGE Network Management Card on the network
    Access the device web interface via its IP address and examine the login page or device information section for product identification strings such as 'MGE Network Management Card' or '66074'. Alternatively, perform an Nmap scan of the management interface and check HTTP headers or SSL certificate subjects for 'MGE' or 'Schneider Electric' identifiers.
    Affected if The device is identified as a Schneider Electric 66074 MGE Network Management Card or displays MGE branding in the web interface.
  2. Verify if HTTP (non-SSL) access is enabled
    Attempt to access the device using HTTP (port 80) rather than HTTPS. If the connection succeeds and displays the login page or device status, HTTP access is enabled. Alternatively, check the device 'Network' or 'System' settings page for an SSL/TLS enable/disable option.
    Affected if The device responds over HTTP on port 80 without redirecting to HTTPS, indicating HTTP access is permitted.
  3. Check the Access Control page for cleartext credential transmission
    Navigate to the specific endpoint '/ups/pas_cont.htm' over HTTP (example: http://<device-ip>/ups/pas_cont.htm). Log in with administrative credentials and observe whether the page displays or transmits username and password fields or account data in plain, unencrypted text.
    Affected if The '/ups/pas_cont.htm' page loads over HTTP and displays administrative user accounts, passwords, or access control settings in cleartext without SSL encryption indicators.
  4. Confirm SSL is disabled in device security settings
    Access the device web interface and navigate to the SSL/TLS or Security configuration section (often under 'Network Settings', 'Security', or 'Access Control'). Verify whether SSL or HTTPS is listed as disabled, not configured, or set to HTTP-only.
    Affected if The device SSL/TLS setting is disabled, set to 'Off', or configured to allow only HTTP connections.

A user is affected if the MGE Network Management Card (66074) is present and SSL/TLS is not enabled, allowing the Access Control page at /ups/pas_cont.htm to be accessed over HTTP with credentials transmitted in cleartext.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Enable SSL/TLS encryption on the affected device's web interface and ensure all administrative access occurs over HTTPS. Change default administrative credentials and consider network segmentation to limit exposure of the management interface.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence
  1. Enable SSL/HTTPS on the MGE Network Management Card by accessing the device's web interface and configuring the security settings to use SSL (Port 443/TCP instead of Port 80/TCP)
  2. Change the default administrative account password to a strong, unique password
  3. If the device supports firmware updates, check Schneider Electric's official support website (www.schneider-electric.com) for any available firmware updates that address this vulnerability
  4. Verify that all access to the management interface uses HTTPS after configuration
Caveat Enabling SSL may require reconfiguration of any existing integration or monitoring systems that rely on HTTP access

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in 66074 Mge Network Management Card Transverse Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
18.0 hours of engineering $3,200
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-7246 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-7246 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data