CVE-2018-8856
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPhilips e-Alert Unit (non-medical device), Version R2.1 and prior. The software contains hard-coded cryptographic key, which it uses for encryption of internal data.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Philips e-Alert Unit firmware contains a hard-coded cryptographic key embedded in the software binary. This key is used to encrypt internal data stored on the device. Anyone with access to the firmware or device can extract this key, allowing them to decrypt sensitive data or impersonate the device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= r2.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed firmware versionAccess the Philips e-Alert Unit management interface or use the device's built-in version check command (typically available via web UI or CLI). Look for the firmware version string (e.g., r2.1, r2.0, etc.).Affected if The displayed firmware version is r2.1 or any version lower than r2.1 (e.g., r2.0, r1.x).
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Verify version against affected rangeCompare the identified firmware version number to the affected range: <= r2.1. Confirm whether your version falls at or below r2.1.Affected if The installed firmware version is r2.1 or earlier.
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Examine firmware binary for embedded keysIf you have access to the firmware image file (obtained from device backup, update file, or manufacturer), use a hex editor or strings command to search for cryptographic key patterns (e.g., long hex strings, base64-encoded data that decodes to 128/256-bit keys). Look for hardcoded secrets that appear in plaintext within the binary.Affected if A hardcoded cryptographic key is found embedded in the firmware binary in plaintext or with minimal obfuscation.
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Check for default/static encryption materialReview any configuration exports or data backups from the e-Alert Unit. Attempt to identify if encryption relies on a static key that does not change between devices or firmware versions. Document whether the same key material would decrypt data from another identical device.Affected if The same encryption key would work across multiple devices or persists unchanged after firmware updates.
Your environment is affected if the Philips e-Alert Unit runs firmware version r2.1 or earlier, or if analysis of the firmware image reveals a hardcoded cryptographic key.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedReplace the hardcoded key with a properly managed key generation/derivation mechanism, such as keys generated at first boot using hardware security modules or secure key storage, and ensure existing encrypted data is re-encrypted with the new key through a firmware update.
Obtain the fixed firmware release from Philips (contact Philips security team for R2.2 or later version containing the remediation)
- 1. Identify all Philips e-Alert units in the environment running firmware version R2.1 or prior.
- 2. Contact Philips directly through their official security contact channels to obtain the patched firmware version.
- 3. Review Philips release notes and security advisories for the specific fixed firmware version that addresses CVE-2018-8856.
- 4. Download the patched firmware from Philips official support portal only.
- 5. Follow Philips documented firmware update procedure for e-Alert units, ensuring proper backup of configuration.
- 6. Verify the firmware update was successful and confirm the hard-coded credential vulnerability is addressed.
- 7. Change any credentials that may have been protected by the hard-coded cryptographic key.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-8856 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-8856 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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