CVE-2018-9310
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in MagniComp SysInfo before 10-H82 if setuid root (the default). This vulnerability allows any local user on a Linux/UNIX system to run SysInfo and obtain a root shell, which can be used to compromise the local system.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMagniComp SysInfo versions before 10-H82 ship with setuid root permissions by default. This allows any local user on the system to execute the binary and leverage a privilege escalation flaw to obtain a root shell, fully compromising the local system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 10-h76, <= 10-h81CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the MagniComp SysInfo binaryRun 'find / -name sysinfo* -o -name mcsi* 2>/dev/null' or check common locations like /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /opt/magnicompAffected if The binary exists on the system
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Check the installed versionRun the binary with --version or -v flag, or check RPM/DEB package info with 'rpm -qi' or 'dpkg -l' for the package name containing 'sysinfo' or 'magnicomp'Affected if Version is between 10-h76 and 10-h81 inclusive
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Verify setuid root permissionsRun 'ls -la <path_to_binary>' and look for 's' in the owner execute field (e.g., -rwsr-xr-x)Affected if The setuid bit is set and owned by root
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Confirm world-executable permissionsCheck the file permissions - if others have execute permission (last three characters include 'x'), any local user can run itAffected if The binary is executable by all users (o+x permission)
A user is affected if MagniComp SysInfo version 10-h76 through 10-h81 is installed with the setuid bit enabled, allowing any local user to execute it and potentially escalate privileges.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade MagniComp SysInfo to version 10-H82 or later. If the setuid functionality is not required, consider removing the setuid bit after upgrading to reduce the attack surface.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-9310 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-9310 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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