CVE-2018-9386
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn reboot_block_command of htc reboot_block driver, there is a possible stack buffer overflow due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA stack buffer overflow exists in the reboot_block_command function of the HTC reboot_block kernel driver due to a missing bounds check on user-supplied input. This allows a local attacker with System execution privileges to potentially escalate privileges. The vulnerability does not require user interaction.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device manufacturerCheck if the device is from HTC by running 'getprop ro.product.manufacturer' or 'getprop ro.build.manufacturer' in a terminal or ADB shellAffected if Device is not HTC hardware - the HTC reboot_block driver is vendor-specific and unlikely to be present on non-HTC devices
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Verify reboot_block driver presenceCheck for the existence of the reboot_block driver by examining /proc/modules, /sys/module/, or searching for 'reboot_block' in /proc/kallsyms if availableAffected if The reboot_block module or symbol is not found in the kernel - the vulnerable driver is not present
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Confirm driver is loaded or built-inRun 'lsmod' to check if reboot_block is loaded as a module, or check kernel config for built-in driver statusAffected if The driver is neither loaded nor compiled as built-in - the attack surface does not exist
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Check for System privileges contextDetermine if the detection is running in a context with System-level privileges (UID 1000) using 'id' command or checking /proc/self/status for UidAffected if Exploitation requires System execution privileges (UID 1000) - lower privilege levels cannot directly trigger this vulnerability
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Confirm Android versionRun 'getprop ro.build.version.release' to identify the Android versionAffected if All Android versions are affected per the CVE, but confirming version helps with scoping and remediation tracking
Device is affected if it is HTC hardware with the reboot_block kernel driver present or loaded, and the attacker has System-level execution privileges.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply a bounds check to the input buffer in the reboot_block_command function within the HTC reboot_block driver, then rebuild and deploy the patched kernel/driver.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,464.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-9386 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-9386 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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