CVE-2018-9567
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedOn Pixel devices there is a bug causing verified boot to show the same certificate fingerprint despite using different signing keys. This may lead to local escalation of privilege if people are relying on those fingerprints to determine what version of the OS the device is running, with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android. Versions: Android kernel. Android ID: A-65543936.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceOn Pixel devices, verified boot incorrectly displays the same certificate fingerprint when different signing keys are used. This allows a local attacker with System execution privileges to potentially misrepresent the OS version and bypass verified boot integrity checks that users or security tools rely on for determining device state.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Pixel device modelRun 'getprop ro.product.model' or check device settings to confirm the device is a Google Pixel deviceAffected if Device is a Google Pixel (Pixel, Pixel XL, Pixel 2, Pixel 2 XL, etc.)
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Check verified boot stateRun 'adb shell verity_enabled' or check /sys/kernel/boot_verity/boot_verity_state if availableAffected if Verified boot is enabled and operational
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Retrieve current certificate fingerprintRun 'adb shell dm-verity status' or check /system/etc/verity_key to obtain the displayed certificate fingerprintAffected if A certificate fingerprint is reported by verified boot
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Cross-reference fingerprint consistencyCompare the obtained fingerprint against Google's published factory images fingerprint for the same device and Android version (available on Google's developer site)Affected if The displayed fingerprint matches the published fingerprint but was generated with different signing keys than expected
A user is affected if running a Google Pixel device with verified boot enabled where the certificate fingerprint displayed matches a known reference despite being generated with different signing keys than the original.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the vendor security patch for CVE-2018-9567; avoid relying solely on certificate fingerprints for OS version verification until the patch is deployed.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-9567 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-9567 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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