CVE-2019-1003070
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedJenkins veracode-scanner Plugin stores credentials unencrypted in its global configuration file on the Jenkins master where they can be viewed by users with access to the master file system.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Jenkins veracode-scanner Plugin stores credentials (likely API keys or tokens for Veracode scanning) in plaintext within its global configuration file on the Jenkins master filesystem. Any user with file system access to the Jenkins master can read these stored credentials without authentication or encryption barriers.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if Veracode Scanner plugin is installedNavigate to Manage Jenkins > Manage Plugins > Installed tab and search for 'Veracode Scanner', or check for the plugin directory at $JENKINS_HOME/plugins/veracode-scanner/Affected if The plugin appears in the installed plugins list or the plugin directory exists on the filesystem
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Locate the plugin's global configuration fileLook for the configuration file at $JENKINS_HOME/org.jenkinsci.plugins.veracode_scanner.config.xml or $JENKINS_HOME/jenkins.model.JenkinsLocationConfiguration.xml (the exact path depends on how the plugin stores its config)Affected if A configuration XML file associated with the veracode-scanner plugin exists in the Jenkins home directory
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Inspect the configuration file for plaintext credentialsOpen the configuration file using a text editor or run: cat $JENKINS_HOME/org.jenkinsci.plugins.veracode_scanner.config.xml (or the located config file path)Affected if The file contains readable strings resembling API keys, tokens, passwords, or other credential-like values in plaintext (not base64 encoded, encrypted, or obscured)
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Verify credential storage methodSearch the configuration file content for XML elements containing credential data - look for elements like <apiKey>, <token>, <password>, or any field containing a raw alphanumeric string used for authentication to VeracodeAffected if Credentials are stored in plain XML elements without encryption or Jenkins credential binding references
If the Veracode Scanner plugin is installed and its configuration file contains readable API keys or tokens in plaintext, the environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataMigrate credentials storage to use Jenkins' built-in Credentials API, which provides encrypted storage. Existing plaintext credentials should be migrated to the secure credential store, and the plugin should be updated to retrieve credentials through the Credentials binding mechanism rather than reading directly from the configuration file.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-1003070 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1003070 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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