Hyper.sh CommonsApplication · Jenkins

CVE-2019-1003074

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2019-04-04
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
94/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Jenkins Hyper.sh Commons Plugin stores credentials unencrypted in its global configuration file on the Jenkins master where they can be viewed by users with access to the master file system.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Jenkins Hyper.sh Commons Plugin stores credentials unencrypted in plaintext within its global configuration file on the Jenkins master. Users with file system access to the Jenkins master can directly read these credentials from the configuration file.

MitigationMigrate credentials from plaintext storage to Jenkins' built-in encrypted credential store, and restrict filesystem access to the Jenkins master to only authorized administrators.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Hyper.sh CommonsApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify Hyper.sh Commons plugin is installed
    Navigate to Jenkins > Manage Jenkins > Manage Plugins > Installed and search for 'Hyper.sh Commons', or list installed plugins via CLI: jenkins-cli.jar or direct filesystem inspection of $JENKINS_HOME/plugins/
    Affected if The plugin appears in the list of installed plugins
  2. Locate the plugin global configuration file
    Inspect $JENKINS_HOME for a configuration file associated with the Hyper.sh Commons plugin, typically named with the plugin identifier (such as org.jenkinsci.plugins.hyper shcommons.xml) in the Jenkins home directory or within the plugin's dedicated folder in $JENKINS_HOME/plugins/
    Affected if A configuration file for the Hyper.sh Commons plugin exists at the expected location
  3. Inspect configuration file for plaintext credentials
    Open the configuration file identified in step 2 using a text editor or command-line tool (cat, type) and search for credential fields such as username, password, secretKey, accessKey, or similar sensitive data stored in cleartext format
    Affected if Readable plaintext credentials (usernames, passwords, API keys, or secrets) are present in the configuration file content
  4. Check filesystem permissions on the configuration file
    Run 'ls -la' or 'icacls' on the configuration file to verify which OS users have read access to the file
    Affected if Non-administrator users or the 'jenkins' service account user have read permissions to the configuration file containing plaintext credentials

A user is affected if the Hyper.sh Commons plugin is installed and its global configuration file contains readable plaintext credentials accessible to users with filesystem access.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Migrate credentials from plaintext storage to Jenkins' built-in encrypted credential store, and restrict filesystem access to the Jenkins master to only authorized administrators.

Fix this in Hyper.sh Commons Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
14.0 hours of engineering $2,490
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1003074 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data