Unified Communications SoftwareApplication · Polycom

CVE-2019-10688

MEDIUM · 6.8 CVSS v3.0 Published 2019-04-23
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 5.8.0 or later.
See remediation →
73/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
VVX products with software versions including and prior to, UCS 5.9.2 with Better Together over Ethernet Connector (BToE) application 3.9.1, use hard-coded credentials to establish connections between the host application and the device.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

Poly VVX business IP phones running UCS 5.9.2 or earlier with the Better Together over Ethernet (BToE) Connector application 3.9.1 contain hard-coded credentials embedded in the firmware. These credentials are used for authentication between the host application and the device, allowing an attacker with knowledge of these credentials to potentially gain unauthorized access to the device or intercept/manipulate the host-device communication.

MitigationUpdate the VVX device firmware to a version newer than UCS 5.9.2 with BToE application newer than 3.9.1. If updates are unavailable, implement network segmentation to isolate VoIP devices and restrict access to management interfaces.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Unified Communications SoftwareApplication
Affected:<= 5.8.0
Better Together Over Ethernet ConnectorApplication
Affected:<= 3.8.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Physical
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the device model
    Access the phone's web interface, check the admin menu under 'Device Information', or inspect the SIP banner/banner response to confirm the device is a Poly VVX business IP phone
    Affected if The device is not a Poly VVX model, then it is not affected by this specific vulnerability
  2. Check the UCS firmware version
    Log into the phone's web interface as admin, navigate to 'Device Information' or 'About' page. Alternatively, access the admin menu on the device itself under Settings > Status > Platform or similar. Extract the Unified Communications Software (UCS) version number
    Affected if The installed UCS version is 5.8.0 or earlier (e.g., 5.7.x, 5.6.x, etc.)
  3. Check the BToE Connector application version
    On the host computer with the BToE Connector installed, open the application and check 'About' or 'Version' information. Alternatively, check the installed programs list on the Windows system or the application manifest if accessible
    Affected if The Better Together over Ethernet Connector version is 3.8.0 or earlier (e.g., 3.7.x, 3.6.x, etc.)
  4. Verify if BToE is enabled
    Access the phone's web interface and navigate to Applications > Better Together over Ethernet or similar path. Check if BToE pairing is configured and active. On the host side, verify if the BToE Connector application is running or set to auto-start
    Affected if BToE pairing is configured and the BToE Connector application is installed and active, creating the communication channel where hard-coded credentials would be used

The environment is affected if a Poly VVX phone is running UCS firmware version 5.8.0 or earlier AND has the BToE Connector application version 3.8.0 or earlier installed and enabled on the host system.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 5.8.0
Interim mitigation

Update the VVX device firmware to a version newer than UCS 5.9.2 with BToE application newer than 3.9.1. If updates are unavailable, implement network segmentation to isolate VoIP devices and restrict access to management interfaces.

Fix this in Unified Communications Software Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
18.0 hours of engineering $3,200
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-10688 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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